# The French Strategy in Africa:
## France's Role on the Continent & its Implications for American Foreign Policy

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# Abstract

In the post-World War II era, the nature of military interventions by traditional powers has changed dramatically due to changes in political priorities and the kinds of conflicts emerging in the world. Especially in the case of the French, national security interests and the decision-making process for engaging in foreign interventions has diverged significantly from the previous era and the modern American format. France has a long history of intervention on the African continent due in part to its colonial history, but also because of its modern economic and security interests there. The aim of this thesis is to articulate a framework for describing French strategy in the region and its implications for American foreign policy decisions. Contrary to the pattern of heavy-footprint, nation building interventions by the United States during this time period, the French format can instead be characterized by the rapid deployment of light forces in the attempt to successfully achieve immediate, but moderate objectives. French policy regarding Africa is based on the principles of strategic autonomy, the maintenance their status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the 'Europeanization' of future initiatives. In order to achieve these objectives, France has pursued a foreign policy designed to allow flexibility and selectivity in choosing whether to intervene and to maintain the relative balance of power within their sphere of influence with itself as the regional stabilizer. This will require a high frequency of interventions, at least in the short- to medium-term period, and means that the United States will be able to take a secondary role in the region, allowing the French to both intervene independently and to lead multinational coalitions on the continent.

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*"…car sans l'Afrique il n'y aura pas d'Histoire de France au XXIè siècle."*[1]

*"…for without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st century."*

- François Mitterrand, Minister of the Interior (1957)
  President of France, 1981 – 1995

[1] Marchesin, Phillippe. "Mitterrand L'africain." *Université de Paris* I (1995): 8. Web. <http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/058005.pdf>.

## Table of Contents

# I. Defining Strategy

## Foreign Policy's Significance in 2017

Following the surprise British vote to leave the European Union in June 2016 and the election of Donald Trump to the American presidency in November of the same year, many believed the Western world to be moving down a path to populist and nationalist politics and a repudiation of globalization. The rise of Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen in polls of the Dutch and French elections scheduled for early 2017 seemed to confirm this trend.[2] Despite Le Pen maintaining that her foreign policy goal of "order will at times require military operations overseas" to protect French interests around the globe and her labeling of Africa as her top international priority, many analysts fear that a Le Pen victory would mean a severely diminished presence for France around the world.[3] Her assertion that independence precludes interdependence, that France's role in the world is in fact limited by its international alliances and global presence represents a dangerous message not only for the new 'liberal order,' but also for American interests more specifically. Therefore, understanding France's role on the international stage, especially through the lens of its strategy on the African continent, is important for understating what threats constitute American priorities and where the United States needs to be focusing its energy in both the short- and long-term.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the scientific foundations for understanding foreign policy. The following two chapters will outline a brief history of French and American foreign policies since World War II and the current national interests both countries have in

[2] Mammone, Andrea. "Europe's nationalist international." Politics | Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, 28 Apr. 2017.
[3] Shapiro, Manuel Lafont RapnouilJeremy. "Marine Le Pen's Bait-and-Switch Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy. N.p., 19 Apr. 2017. Web. 08 May 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/19/marine-le-pens-bait-and-switch-foreign-policy/>.

Africa. Then there will be a series of case studies analyzing the reasons the United States and France have had for interventions in recent years. Finally, the case studies will be used to draw certain conclusions about the French strategy in order to predict future French actions on the continent, and that strategy's implications for American policy in Africa moving forward.

## Theoretical Foundations for Geopolitical Strategy

Strategy, in the colloquial sense, is a broad term used to represent several different levels of long-term planning. It ranges from the discussion of strategic objectives to the methods used to fulfill those objectives without any real distinction between those differences. In a more theoretical sense, strategy is just one level of a broader plan designed to promote a state's national interests. Most strategy theorists view the planning process to be made up of four distinct levels: tactics, operations, strategy, and grand strategy. In order to understand a French strategy in Africa then, it is first necessary to understand the theoretical background of the terms being used to describe that strategy.

### The Tactical Level

Tactics represent a "commander's… plans for the deployment and employment of his forces in order to gain victory over the enemy."[4] They represent a combination of science and art in the employment of units and weaponry to maximize their most immediate possible advantage. They are highly dependent upon the conditions of the particular situation and the technological

[4] Rogers, Clifford J. "Strategy, Operational Design, and Tactics." International Encyclopedia of Military History (2006): 1. Web. <https://www.academia.edu/13085191/Strategy_Operational_Design_and_Tactics>.

capabilities of the commander's forces. These influence what greater agendas commanders and political leaders set because they limit the scope of what can actually be accomplished.

## The Operational Level

Probably the vaguest of these terms, operational art represents the connection between tactical capabilities and political objectives. The operational level represents the relation between space, means, time, and purpose.[5] The challenge of this level comes from finding an equilibrium that properly balances each of these elements, often with contradictory objectives, in order to make the most progress towards the ultimate strategic objectives.

## The Strategic Level

Strategy itself is a broader term used to describe "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."[6] It refers to high level, long term planning through the development of new capabilities, relationships, and positioning in order to preserve a state's strategic goals and ensure its own security. NATO defines strategy as "that component… presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations."[7] It does not implicitly rely upon the use of force, as strategy can also rely upon the threat of force, preemptive or retaliatory, in order to achieve national security goals.

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[5] Robinson, James R. "The Rommel Myth." Military Review 77.5 (1997): 2. Web. <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-26324710/the-rommel-myth>.
[6] Liddell Hart, B. H. "Strategy ." Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy. N.p., 1956. Web. <http://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html>.
[7] Aksit, Cihangir, Dr. *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*. Rep. N.p.: n.p., 2013. Print. p 136.

Grand Strategy

The distinction between strategy and grand strategy is a vague one. Grand strategy is not limited to only military capabilities, but rather describes a forward-looking orientation that combines both military science and foreign policy to secure national interests. One definition of grand strategy proposes it as the "purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community."[8] Another definition, offered by Barry Posen (Director of the MIT Security Studies Program), describes it as "that collection of military, economic and political means and ends with which a state attempts to achieve security."[9] Understanding grand strategy offers an important foundation from which to study a state's intervention strategy as it provides a better framework for understanding the long-term objectives of a state's actions. In addition, the distinction between tactics, operations, strategy and grand strategy provides a solid basis for the inclusion of factors beyond simply the military in order to more comprehensively analyze a state's long-term interests.

**Theories in International Relations**

In order to successfully describe and define a coherent French strategy in Africa, a basic understanding of the major theories underlying international relations is necessary. The two main theories are realism and liberalism, though both have inspired several derivatives that focus on different influences and emphasize different objectives. Most nations cannot be categorized solely by one of these theories; instead, they tend to fluctuate between them, depending on the political party in office, the head of state, domestic conditions, and international considerations.

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[8] Gray, Colin. *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History*, Abingdon and New York City: Routledge 2007, p. 283.

[9] Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p 7.

Realism

The predominant theory in international relations, realism bases itself in the belief that world politics represents a field of conflict among different state powers, whose material power determines their place in the international order and what actions they are capable of executing. Any actions a state takes on the international stage are directly influenced by their need to protect their own national interests. Realism assumes that the international system is anarchic, due to the lack of a unifying authority capable of enforcing any rules, which mean that a state's interactions with other states occur within the context of the relative balance of power.[10] These balances of power can occur at not just the worldwide level, but at the regional level as well, and dictate both global and local military and political alliances. In regions that lack strong states with the ability to maintain their own internal security, an external state will often take on the role of balancer to ensure regional stability. Based on these power structures, external balancers make the decision to intervene in other states due to the importance of those other states to their own national and security interests, as well as the likelihood of a regional destabilization to occur because of internal or external aggression against a state in the region.[11]

Liberalism

Liberalism, the other competing theory of international relations, can be briefly described as "the idea that international organizations, international economic cooperation, interdependence, and democracy allow states to avoid power politics and establish a lasting

[10] Morgenthau, Hans J. *Power Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
[11] Lake, David A. "Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach." In *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, edited by David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. p 45 – 67.

peace."[12] This theory highlights the ability of international institutions to improve cooperation between states. Liberalists point to the fact that interactions between modern nations are increasingly nonviolent and tend to revolve around economic and cultural objectives, rather than security and defense. The increased interdependence of nations due to this economic and cultural diffusion have led to the application of this theory in support of humanitarian interventions.[13]

[12] Shiraev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Presses. p 384-385.
[13] Shiraev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Presses. P 386.

# II. French Policy Evolution

### French Colonial Ties to Africa

France initially began its colonization efforts in Africa around 1830 with the capture of Algiers. Though it ultimately required 17 years to fully secure Algeria and colonize the nation,[14] the French also used this time to expand their holdings in Senegal and began the construction of a modern economy there.[15] This is often referred to as the beginning of the 'Second French Colonial Empire,' as the timeline also reflects a shift away from the America's, where France had recently lost most of its territories to its European rivals.

By 1870, France had extended its reach deep into North, West and Central Africa, claiming territory in what are now over 19 different states including: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Mali, Senegal, Guinea, Gabon, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, Gambia, Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Djibouti.[16] The objective was to build a horizontal axis across the continent as a means for controlling transportation and communication across the continent. This period saw intense investment by the French for the extraction of natural resources, as well as the purposeful diffusion of French language and culture throughout the region.[17] The French, like most other European powers, viewed it as their explicit moral responsibility to bring civilization and religion to the 'uncivilized' world.[18] In an attempt to strengthen ties between France and its colonies, the French

[14]Appiah, Kwame Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. *Encyclopedia of Africa*. Vol. 1. N.p.: Oxford U Press, 2010. Print. p 90.
[15] G. Wesley Johnson, *Double Impact: France and Africa in the age of imperialism* (Greenwood 1985)
[16] See Appendix Figure A
[17] T. G. Otte, "From 'War-in-Sight' to Nearly War: Anglo–French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875–1898," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* (2006) 17#4 p 693–714.
[18] Chafer, Tony. *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization*? N.p.: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002. Print. p. 84–85.

began to offer citizenship in some of their colonies,[19] provided the applicant met certain requirements, and even allowed local populations to vote on their own representatives for the French Chamber of Deputies.[20]

France continued to exploit its colonies throughout both world wars and even recruited many of its soldiers from its overseas territories. Following World War II, France had no intention of granting its colonies independence. However, after its defeat at home to the Germans, nearly a decade of costly war in Indochina, and the brutal Algerian War, it became clear that the French no longer possessed the capacity to win a major conventional war and that the cost of holding on to its territories would be too high for France. By the end of the Algerian War in 1962, the domestic situation in France had deteriorated to the point that the country was forced to abandon its constitution and form the new Fifth Republic.[21] Ultimately, France gave up almost all of its territories as popular sentiment for decolonization increased and the economic and political costs of holding onto the empire continued to rise.

**Françafrique: 1960 - 1994**

Despite the dissolution of their colonial empire, France remained highly active in Africa through the remainder of the 20th century. First used by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire in 1955 to describe the benefits, economic and security, of maintaining a close relationship with Paris,[22] the word *françafrique*[23] has become a derogatory term for describing

[19] Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period*. Cambridge: Cambridge U Press, 1990. Print. p 264.
[20] Segalla, Spencer. 2009, *The Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912–1956*. Nebraska University Press.
[21] Berstein, Serge, and Peter Morris. *The Republic of de Gaulle 1958-1969* (The Cambridge History of Modern France) (2006)
[22] O, D. "Félix Houphouët-Boigny: Builder of Modern Ivory Coast." *Africa*. Africa.gm, 5 Feb. 2009.
[23] Gregory, S. "The French Military In Africa: Past And Present." *African Affairs* 99.396 (2000): 435-448.

France's sphere of influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. It references both the network of influence and freedom of action France has enjoyed since decolonization.

Beginning with the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, France has carefully developed and institutionalized a system of discrete influence in Africa. President de Gaulle created the position of Chief Advisor to the Government of France on Africa Policy, to which he appointed his close advisor Jacques Foccart, with the mission of maintaining African dependence on the former colonial power.[24] The 'African Cell' in the Elysée Palace[25] was instituted to bypass traditional foreign policy mechanisms, to create a small group of advisors that would report directly to the president, and to unilaterally determine France's foreign policy regarding its sphere of influence on the continent.[26] The group grew so powerful that it was regarded to have "pulled the strings from Abidjan to Libreville and reported directly to Jacques Foccart… a man who could decide to overthrow a president or send French paratroopers to rescue one."[27]

Following the loss of Algeria and its Sub-Saharan colonies, France's first military intervention in West Africa took place during a coup in Gabon in February 1964.[28] The French continued to intervene throughout the next four decades and under the leadership of both sides of the political spectrum. François Mitterrand, president from 1981 until 1995, "intervened with greater frequency than any previous French president"[29] despite the Socialist Party's objections

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[24] Verschave, François-Xavier. "Defining Françafrique by François Xavier Verschave." *Survie*. Survie, 18 Feb. 2006.
[25] French equivalent of the White House
[26] Haski, Pierre. "The Return of Françafrique." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 21 July 2013.
[27] Haski, Pierre. "The Return of Françafrique." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 21 July 2013.
[28] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.
[29] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.

to the practice. However, Mitterrand's legacy and several high profile failures in the 1990's led to a brief discontinuation of the practice. The most famous example of this is the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

In 1990, France launched Operation Noroît to prevent the Rwandan Popular Front (RPF) from overthrowing Juvénal Habyarimana, a long-time ally of France. Though the operation "consisted mainly of logistical support and the provision of military equipment to Rwanda's government," it set the stage for the perceived alliance between France and the Rwandan government. Habyarimana was assassinated in 1994 and genocide broke out in the country, but the French only moved to evacuate their own citizens. When they finally launched Operation Turquoise several months later, the French had already been accused of "facilitating the preparation of the genocide"[30] and sheltering the *génocidaires*.[31] Whether true or not, France's reputation was severely damaged as a result.[32] Due to this event, the failure to protect Mobutu in Zaire, and two successive failures in the Central African Republic, France retreated from its aggressive interventionist policies in Africa to address political unrest at home.

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[30] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.

[31] Dallaire, Roméo, and Brent Beardsley. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. London: Arrow, 2004. Print.

[32] Doyle, Mark. "Africa | Ties frayed by decades of tension." *BBC News*. BBC, 24 Nov. 2006. Web. 08 May 2017. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6181988.stm>.

## French Interventions in Africa: 1960 – 1992

| Year | Country | External Threat | Internal Threat | Major Combat Operations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1958 - 1963 | Mauritania | x Morocco | x | x Joint Operation with Spain |
| 1957 - 1964 | Cameroon | | x | x |
| 1963 | Congo-Brazzaville | | x Limited, ultimately opted not to save Fulbert Youlou | |
| 1964 | Gabon | | x | x |
| 1968-1972 | Chad | | x | x |
| 1969 | Biafra / Nigeria | | x Not Francophone Africa, but Nigerian Civil War had important effect on region, France supported Biafran forces with arms. | |
| 1970 | Côte d'Ivoire | | x | Unkown |
| 1977 - 1978 | Mauritania / Western Sahara | x Polisario | | x |
| 1977 | Djibouti | | x | |
| 1977 - 1978 | Zaire | x Rebels supported by Cubans invading Shaba province from Angola in 1977 and 1978 | | x Joint Operation with Belgium in May 1978 |
| 1978 - 1979 | Chad | | x | x |
| 1979 | Central African Republic | | | x French overthrow of emporer, Jean-Bédel Bokassa |

33

| Year | Country | External Threat | Internal Threat | Major Combat Operations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | Niger | x Libya | | |
| 1981 | Cameroon | x Nigeria | | |
| 1983 - 1984 | Chad | x Libya | | x |
| 1986 | Togo | | x | |
| 1986 - 2007 | Chad | x Libya to 1990 | x Limited Internal Security after Libyan withdrawal against rebellions | x |
| 1989 | Comoros | | | |
| 1990 - 1993 | Rwanda | x French Mercenary Takeover | x | x |
| 1990 | Gabon | | x | x |
| 1991 | Togo | | x | |
| 1991 | Benin | | x | |
| 1991 | Zaire | | x | x Joint Operation with Belgian Forces to stop army mutiny and political demonstrations, hundreds of Zaireans possiby killed by French and Belgian troops. |
| 1991 | Djibouti | x Somalia | x | |
| 1992 - 1993 | Djibouti | x Somalia | x | |

34

[33] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.

[34] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.

## French Interventions in Africa: 1992 – 2017

| Year | Country | External Threat | Internal Threat | Major Combat Operations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1993 | Zaire | | x | Unknown |
| 1994 | Cameroon | x Nigeria | | |
| 1994 | Rwanda | | x Evacuating citizens at beginning of genocide | |
| 1994 | Rwanda | | x Turquoise, setting up security zones after genocide to stabilize country | |
| 1995 | Comoros | x French Mercenary Takeover | | x |
| 1996 | Central African Republic | | x | |
| 1997, March | Congo-Brazzaville | | x | |
| 1997, June | Congo-Brazzaville | | x | |
| 1997, June | Congo-Brazzaville | | x | |
| 2002 - 2007 | Côte d'Ivoire | Whether or not the rebellion was from outside the country and from where remains unkown. | x | x French and UN troops maintain a cease-fire line. Nine French sldiers died in Ivoirian government air attack in November 2004. French commandos destroyed the Ivoirian air force at Yamoussoukro in retaliation. |
| 2006 | Chad (French government currently denies the overt involvement of French troops in 2006 fighting.) | x Darfur spillover | x Rebellion - French troops allegedly took part in surpressing the April 2006 attack on N'Djamena. | x |
| 2006 | Central African Republic | x Darfur spillover | x | x |
| 2008 - 2017 | Somalia | | x | x Joint Operation with EU Naval Force |
| 2010 - 2011 | Côte d'Ivoire | x Liberian Mercenaries | x | x Joint Operation with UNOCI |
| 2011 | Libya | | x | x Joint operation with NATO and regional partners |
| 2011 - 2017 | Mali | x | x | x |
| 2013 - 2017 | Central African Republic | | x | x Joint Operation with UN and AU |

35

## Modern French Interests in Africa

Modern French foreign policy makers do not formulate policy directly from traditional theories such as realism or liberalism. There are similarities between the French strategy and these theories, of course, and depending on the president, intervention decisions might be influenced by them. However, much of the French strategy revolves around strategic political

[35] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.

and economic considerations. As a result, French policy appears to be guided by pure self-interest more than humanitarian or other 'liberal' justifications. To better understand French reasoning however, it is easier to divide their national interests into three distinct categories: political and cultural, economic, and security and defense.

Political and Cultural:

The massive movement of people back and forth between France and its former African colonies plays a great role in the way it views these states. Approximately 240,000 French nationals currently live in former French colonies on the continent.[36] French citizens also constitute the "top long-haul source" of tourists for the continent.[37] One of the most common justifications cited by the French for intervening abroad is the protection of its citizens in these countries. French citizens are also generally concerned about Africa. Some estimates place almost "150,000 to 200,000 French people work[ing] in NGOs or… associations and civic groups… with Africa connections"[38] and there are several million citizens of Sub-Saharan and Maghrebi descent.[39]

Additionally, France developed a post-imperial immigration system that favors citizens of its former colonies and permits them significantly easier access into the country. The reverse is also true. Because of this policy, France now has a significant domestic Muslim population. Much of this population lives in low-income housing projects in the *banlieus*[40] surrounding Paris

[36] Hansen, Andrew. "Backgrounder: The French Military in Africa." *The New York Times*. 09 Feb. 2007.
[37] Messerli, Hannah, et al. *Tourism in Africa: Harnessing Tourism Fro Growth & Improved Livelihoods*. Rep. Washington: World Bank Publications, 2014. *World Bank*. 2013.
[38] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.
[39] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.
[40] Suburbs of large cities

and other major cities, "often in perceived poverty traps."[41] The result has been the intensifying of tensions between ethnically French citizens and the domestic Muslim population, and though not the only factor in driving their foreign policy, the French certainly consider domestic sentiment regarding any potential intervention. The consequences of the 1990's are a great example. President Chirac's decision not to alienate this segment of the population and oppose the War in Iraq[42] is another, though he would not have hesitated had he felt it was truly in France's strategic interest to participate.

Economic:

France places greater importance on the economics of these states than any other external actor, though China and several other emerging economies such as Brazil, India and Turkey have significantly increased their presence on the continent in recent years.[43] Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowing from France to Africa totaled almost $19 billion in 2014 according the UN's Conference on Trade and development's 2015 report on world investment.[44] This accounted for roughly 40% of all FDI inflows from the EU and 22% of global FDI into Africa.[45] In fact, it is 2.3 times the investment made by the United States and 3.1 times the investment made by China during the same year.[46]

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[41] Lepoutre, David. *Coeur de banlieue: codes, rites, et langages*. Odile Jacob, 1997.
[42] Vaisse, Justin. "Making Sense of French Foreign Policy." *Brookings*. Brookings, 28 July 2016.
[43] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.
[44] Zhan, James X, et al. *World Investment Report 2015*. Rep. N.p.: United Nations Publication, 2015.*United Nations Investment Report*. United Nations, 2015.
[45] Zhan, James X, et al. *World Investment Report 2015*. Rep. N.p.: United Nations Publication, 2015.*United Nations Investment Report*. United Nations, 2015.
[46] Zhan, James X, et al. *World Investment Report 2015*. Rep. N.p.: United Nations Publication, 2015.*United Nations Investment Report*. United Nations, 2015.

France's colonial history also significantly contributes to its economic ties with Africa. According to a report issued by the European think-tank FRIDE, "some 20 large companies now account for most of France's economic interests"[47] in Africa. The country still imports a massive amount of natural resources from the continent in support of its domestic energy and manufacturing industries. For example, Areva, the state-owned nuclear power company, acquires 30% of its uranium from Niger;[48] this accounts for roughly one-quarter of France's energy production.[49] Other companies such as Total, Bolloré, Elf and more are dominant oil and gas, telecommunication, military equipment manufacturers, and construction businesses that have "enjoyed preferential access to markets and won key African contracts" due to France's privileged access in the region.[50]

During the process of decolonization, France established two banks responsible for the monetary policy and currency management of its former colonies. The Central Bank of West African States serves eight countries[51] and manages the West African CFA franc.[52] Similarly, the Bank of Central African states serves six countries[53] and manages the Central African CFA

[47] Gregory, S. "The French Military In Africa: Past And Present." *African Affairs* 99.396 (2000): 435-448.
[48] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a New Africa Strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): p 130.
[49] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.
[50] Gregory, S. "The French Military In Africa: Past And Present." *African Affairs* 99.396 (2000): 435-448.
[51] Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo
[52] Mensah, A. "The Process of Monetary Decolonization in Africa." *African Journals* 4.1 (1979): 45-63. *Michigan State University Libraries*. Web. <http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Utafiti/vol4no1/aejp004001007.pdf>.
[53] Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo

franc.[54] Both currencies were pegged to the value of the French franc and are now pegged to the euro.[55]

Security and Defense:

France views its own security as deeply tied to the stability of Africa not only because of its economic and historical ties to the continent, but also due to its proximity. After decolonization, the French government partnered with many of its former colonies to form bilateral treaties "pledging various degrees of military support" based on internal and external threats.[56] Many of these treaties and certain parts of public treaties remain state secrets to this day.[57] Though the French have not always upheld their obligations under these agreements, they have used them as a means of justification for intervention across the continent.

France's physical proximity to the African continent is another challenge for its domestic security. This proximity places the country much closer to insurgencies, terror groups and failed states. Additionally, the large presence of Muslims in the *banlieus* around Paris has proved dangerous as the combination of France's immigration policy and the systemic poverty endemic in many of these neighborhoods has led to the radicalization of some immigrants. Recent terror attacks such as the Charlie Hebdo attack, Paris attacks, and the Bastille Day attack in Nice have only deepened resentment between Christians and Muslims in France. If recent trends continue, France may soon adopt a similar approach to that Israel, "which has accommodated itself to a

[54] Mensah, A. "The Process of Monetary Decolonization in Africa." *African Journals* 4.1 (1979): 45-63. *Michigan State University Libraries*. Web. <http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Utafiti/vol4no1/aejp004001007.pdf>.
[55] Mensah, A. "The Process of Monetary Decolonization in Africa." *African Journals* 4.1 (1979): 45-63. *Michigan State University Libraries*. Web. <http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/Utafiti/vol4no1/aejp004001007.pdf>.
[56] Hansen, Andrew. "Backgrounder: The French Military in Africa." *The New York Times*. 09 Feb. 2007.
[57] Hansen, Andrew. "Backgrounder: The French Military in Africa." *The New York Times*. 09 Feb. 2007.

perpetual battle with radical adversaries."[58] Thus, the French view maintaining peace and stability in Africa, particularly in the North African Maghreb, as an imperative to not only slow immigration[59] rates, but also to improve the relationship between separate factions of its domestic population.

**Principles of French Foreign Policy**

While significant, strategic national interests are not the only influencers driving French foreign policy in Africa. French diplomatic culture has also been ingrained with certain principles over the past half-century that aid in understanding their past decisions and predicting future interventions.

Independence of Action:

The first of these principles is "the necessity to retain independent courses and capacities for action."[60] Despite the political rhetoric calling for the Europeanization and Africanization of some traditionally French international objectives, the French still strongly believe in their right to act unilaterally when they deem it necessary. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has stated that "France's foreign policy independence was the 'trademark of [their] foreign policy and the key to [their] international influence."[61] This is highly similar to the American perspective. Certainly under the Obama administration and several of its immediate

[58] Haddad, Benjamin. "France's Forever War." *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy, 18 Nov. 2015.
[59] Large-scale immigration is also having an economic effect on the French homeland by causing a higher unemployment rate, increasing welfare spending, and further disenchanting much of the immigrant population.
[60] De Galbert, Simond. "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy." *CSIS*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 Sept. 2015.
[61] De Galbert, Simond. "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy." *CSIS*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 Sept. 2015.

predecessors, there has been a push to seek international consensus before acting. However, few American politicians would argue that the United States should give up its ability or downgrade its capacity to act unilaterally whenever an international consensus cannot be reached or core American interests are involved. The French operate much the same.

In their most recent White Paper of Defense, published in 2013, the French argue that even as they continue to push for greater cooperation and coordination with their European partners, the French still believe that they "will be able to contribute more effectively to a collective response if [they are] still able to retain [their] capacity for initiative and leadership."[62] The same concept applies to France's UN and NATO obligations. In a different way of phrasing this, the French have dubbed this principle "strategic autonomy."[63] The belief is that the maintenance of a strong capacity for intervention in "simple" or "predictable" operations[64], or where solely French interests might be concerned, is a critical component for not just maintaining stability, but for displaying their continued relevance as an important actor on the international stage as well.

Some of the main concerns addressed in the 2013 White Paper were the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. At several different points, the paper's authors address the fact that austerity measures in response to the crisis have not only shifted budget priorities, but also the attention of many domestic populations back towards domestic issues. The authors highlight the United States to prove their point. They fear that "other than in the case of the legitimate defense of an ally, the US could become more selective about its external commitments as a result of

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[62] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p 11.
[63] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p 84.
[64] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p 84.

financial constraints [and] the doubts the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have raised about the effectiveness of long-term, heavy footprint foreign intervention."[65] As a result, the French have also used a diminished American presence on the international scene to more strongly assert their continued independence of action.

The United Nations Security Council:

The French believe that their permanent member status on the UN Security Council (UNSC) signifies their distinction as a dominant actor on the international scene and legitimizes the country's right to conduct global diplomacy.[66] However, due to France's realistic standing as a middle-sized power, French policy makers are consistently concerned with maintaining this position and thus see it as necessary to lead multilateral initiatives and support a large diplomatic network and military presence abroad. As a smaller nation with fewer resources, the French have traditionally (mostly) limited that role to the scope of their former colonies in Africa. Instead, the French have opted to construct a sphere of influence in a region with which they are already familiar and one where they already possess an infrastructure dedicated toward maintaining their influence.

A sizeable portion of the 2013 White Paper is dedicated towards explaining and justifying France's position as a permanent member of the UNSC. A brief list of their reasons includes: (1) France has the 5th largest national GDP and is the 5th largest exporter in the world; (2) including France's overseas territories, the DOM-TOM,[67] France has the second largest

[65] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p 29.
[66] De Galbert, Simond. "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy." *CSIS*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 Sept. 2015.
[67] Départements d'Outre Mer – Territoires d'Outre Mer; these are territories still legally controlled by France, such as French Guiana in South America and Réunion in the Indian Ocean.

economic zone behind only the United States; (3) the widespread use of the French language, which the government considers an important cultural asset; (4) a modern, powerful and utilized military; and (5) the large-scale intermixing of the ethnic French population with other groups around the world and France's sizeable immigrant and expatriate populations.[68]

An interesting development in recent years has been the French call for a restructuring of the UNSC. President Sarkozy attempted to "seduce rising powers and the whole continent [of Africa] with his rhetoric of Security Council reform that would lead to adequate representation for Africa."[69] Historically, France has relied on its African allies with rotating, non-permanent seats on the UNSC to support its initiatives there. France and the United Kingdom are the traditional leaders for debates on issues concerning Africa in the UNSC.[70] With the emergence of the BRICS[71] nations as a more cohesive group, though, both countries have had to adopt new strategies for engaging with these nations.[72] This is especially true of Russia and China. In public, France has backed enlargement of the UNSC to reflect changes in the global balance of power; however, it is yet to be seen whether France will continue to favor their francophone allies or pivot to support Nigeria and South Africa as permanent members.[73]

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[68] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p 13.
[69] Gregory, S. "The French Military In Africa: Past And Present." *African Affairs* 99.396 (2000): 435-448.
[70] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.
[71] Acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
[72] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.
[73] Gregory, S. "The French Military In Africa: Past And Present." *African Affairs* 99.396 (2000): 435-448.

Europeanization:

The third principle, briefly mentioned above, is the strong French belief in the "need to move the European project [EU] forward."[74] Though Europe has only three countries with significant military capabilities,[75] "the EU possesses a wealth of expertise in peace negotiations, devolution of power to regional entities, police and justice training, business development, civil society support, governance reform, and more"[76]. Especially due to the fact that Germany remains hesitant to commit forces abroad because of its unique history, utilizing these other capabilities in countries that pose security risks to the EU and its wider environment, in conjunction with increased military support, is a high priority for the French. This is not a new phenomenon either. As early as 2003, President Chirac was using similar rhetoric to articulate the French desire for increased multilateral action by Europe, espousing a policy that endorsed "deciding together about issues that concern us all."[77]

French leadership has a very thorough and unidealistic understanding of its military's capabilities, another factor in the government's call for greater international cooperation in its African endeavors; however, the French also realize the political limitations of this solution and recognize several issues blocking the adoption of a common EU defense policy and EU security force.[78] As a result, they have used these realties to continue justifying their principle of strategic autonomy.

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[74] De Galbert, Simond. "The Hollande Doctrine: Your Guide to Today's French Foreign and Security Policy." *CSIS*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 Sept. 2015.
[75] France, the UK and Germany
[76] Pierini, Marc. "The Conflict in Mali: Lessons for Europe and the United States." *Carnegie Europe*. N.p., 8 Feb. 2013. Web. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50888>.
[77] Vaisse, Justin. "Making Sense of French Foreign Policy | Brookings Institution." *Brookings*. Brookings, 28 July 2016. Web. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/making-sense-of-french-foreign-policy/>.
[78] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p 62.

**Limitations on the French Capacity to Act**

The principles characterizing French policy toward Africa are better understood when contextualized within the limitations France faces in operational capacity, forward deployment, and international support. The French, "highly conscious of [their] small size and limited resources,"[79] have pursued a different strategy than the American model of foreign intervention.

Operational Capacity:

As a mid-sized power with limited resources and moderately-sized armed forces, the French model of intervention rests on limited troop commitments and a firm resolve to not engage in nation-building. This has directly lead to the policy of *juste mésure*, which is the "strive for sufficiency and [the] hope to achieve limited goals through the application of the smallest possible measure of force."[80] Following the Algerian War and the restructuring of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle made significant changes to the French defense budget, including slashing its conventional forces substantially in order to pursue nuclear capabilities and a strategy of deterrence.[81] As a result, the French developed the principle of differentiation of forces, which enables "substantial savings by financing the most expensive or modern capabilities only where they are indispensable… in particular, for the forces tasked with combatting state-level adversaries."[82] These forces are largely concentrated in metropolitan

[79] Shurkin, Michael. "The French Way of War." *RAND Corporation*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2015. Web.
[80] Shurkin, Michael. "The French Way of War." *RAND Corporation*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2015. Web.
[81] Jerome de Lespinois, *L'armée de terre française : de la defense de la sanctuaire á la projection : Volume I, 1974-1981* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), p 77.
[82] Defense, Ministry Of. *French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013*. Tech. Paris: 2013. Print. p85.

France.[83] Thus, the French insist "on modest objectives, on limiting strictly the aims of military intervention in line with a modest assessment of what the military can accomplish."[84]

Limited capabilities have led the military to be obsessively concerned with 'mission creep.' The term refers to the expansion of a mission beyond its original goals after initial success and ultimately catastrophic failure due to overextension. This has led to a refusal by the French to get involved with nation building, instead maintaining a focus on each force's core competency. In Africa, this is limited, but rapid reaction usually involving violence. There are consequences for this. For example, the French intervention in Mali "is not doing a lot of what [the country] needs, but the French are sticking to their policy."[85]

One unique, and rather useful, element of the French Army is the Foreign Legion. The unit is open to any foreign national willing to fight for France. Originally formed in 1831, it was reformed in during the *françafrique* period into a force capable of striking rapidly in a crisis with decisive force to preserve French interests. Though the legion is open to French citizens as well, over 75% of its recruits come from over 140 different foreign nations.[86] What makes the Foreign Legion unique is France's ability to deploy it abroad without risking the same scrutiny it would deploying purely domestic forces. In the United States, the 'Dover Test'[87] is an informal measure of Americans' support for a conflict by judging public reaction to casualties. Utilizing the Foreign Legion rather than purely French forces allows France to more frequently intervene on

[83] France's Territory in Europe
[84] Shurkin, Michael. "The French Way of War." *RAND Corporation*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2015. Web.
[85] Shurkin, Michael. "The French Way of War." *RAND Corporation*. N.p., 17 Nov. 2015. Web.
[86] Douglas Porch (23 June 1992). *The French Foreign Legion: Complete History of The Legendary Fighting Force*. Harper Perennial
[87] The test's name is a reference to Dover Air Force Base, where American casualties tend to arrive after returning from a conflict.

foreign soil without risking the political backfire from incurring casualties and to intervene using different strategies and tactics than would otherwise be the case.

Forward Deployment:

The French capacity to intervene is highly limited by both its military presence on the African continent and the military's limited air lift capabilities. Following the restructuring of their many bilateral defense agreements with African nations in 2008 due to fiscal and strategic considerations, the French now have four permanent *bases opérationnelles avancées* (BOA)[88] in Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Gabon.[89] They also have a de facto permanent airbase N'Djamena, Chad. In total, of the 17,450 military personnel stationed abroad as of March 2017, 7,350 were in Africa, excluding anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the French deployment on Réunion.[90] One important fact to note is the sizeable increase these numbers represent over February of 2013; at that time, France had 10,025 military personal stationed abroad, of which 6,790 were in West and Central Africa.[91] Despite their increased presence however, the French still lack the capacity to launch a long-term, heavy-footprint style intervention in the region.

Instead, this system's design offers the French a variety of options when considering possible courses of action to settle a conflict, as well as providing a level of stability to a volatile region. A permanent presence has enable the French to partner with African militaries to provide

[88] Forward Operating Bases; Defense, Ministry of. *Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées*. Rep. Paris: 2016. Print.
[89] Defense, Ministry of. *Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées*. Rep. Paris: 2016. Print.
[90] See Appendix Figure B
[91] Melly, Paul, and Vincent Darracq. "A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande." *Chatham House*. Chatham House, May 2013.

training and logistical support, as well as provide additional troops in some cases.[92] The French refer to these forces as *les forces de presences*[93] and view them as offering flexibility in their choices for accomplishing their three stated goals: (1) to ensure the defense of French interests and the safety of its expatriates; to support the operational deployments of the French forces in the region; and (3) to contribute to regional operational cooperation.[94] The reigning belief is that a small, but permanent and well-trained force provides not only the opportunity for rapid responses in times of crisis, but also the ability to quickly deploy additional French or multinational forces if the situation requires.

Even with this forward deployment capacity, France's severe lack of an airlift capability limits its options on the continent. The term 'airlift' refers to both strategic and tactical airlift capabilities. Strategic airlifting is the organized delivery of supplies and military personnel over long distances, such as across continents. Tactical airlifts, one the other hand, involve moving resources and materiel to a specific location within the given conflict's theater. France's lack of a strategic airlift capability has been a continuing issue ever since de Gaulle reorganized the French military's budget in the early 1960's. Despite the advantages that permanent French bases and airfields in Africa offer, the French continue to rely on their allies for support in transporting troops to the continent and maintaining pressure through a "high sortie rate" once conducting operations.[95]

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[92] Defense, Ministry of. *Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées*. Rep. Paris: 2016. Print.
[93] Forces of Presence; Defense, Ministry of. *Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées*. Rep. Paris: 2016. Print.
[94] (1) "D'assurer la défense des intérêts français et la sécurité de ses ressortissants; (2) D'appuyer les déploiements opérationnels des forces françaises dans la région, (3) De contribuer à la coopération opérationnelle régionale." Defense, Ministry of. *Les Forces Françaises Prépositionnées*. Rep. Paris: 2016. Print.
[95] Barrie, Douglas, James Hackett, and Henry Boyd. "Douglas Barrie: Behind the Mali Headlines, an Issue of Airlift." *IISS*. International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 Jan. 2013.

International Support:

The final limitation is the reticence of many European nations to involve themselves in African conflicts. The European attitude towards Africa since World War II can be described as a "strategic laziness, a willful ignorance of the overall threat and a lack of political ambition."[96] Whether or not this is the "result of Europe's success in pacifying its own continent and, even more importantly, of living under the military and strategic guardianship of the United States for nearly seventy years"[97] is debatable. Regardless, French efforts at getting other major European players to take a more active role in world events and stabilizing their former colonies have typically been rewarded with limited supply exchanges and air support, rather than the force commitments for which France has asked.

[96] Pierini, Marc. "The Conflict in Mali: Lessons for Europe and the United States." *Carnegie Europe*. N.p., 8 Feb. 2013. Web. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50888>.
[97] Pierini, Marc. "The Conflict in Mali: Lessons for Europe and the United States." *Carnegie Europe*. N.p., 8 Feb. 2013. Web. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50888>.

# III. American Policy Evolution

## Presidential Doctrines

In 1823, President James Monroe unveiled his new policy for the United States regarding European powers and any future steps they might have taken towards capturing independent states in the Western Hemisphere. The statement is regarded as the first explicit 'doctrine' outlining U.S. foreign policy and guided U.S. actions abroad for over a century, with only minor variations. Not until after World War II, when President Harry Truman articulated a new doctrine, did U.S. foreign policy adjust from its isolationist roots to a more global perspective. Following President Truman, almost every American president has either explicitly articulated their own foreign policy doctrines or has been ascribed one based on their policy speeches and the actions they took abroad. The following section will outline the main goals of each presidential doctrine and the underlying motivators for their policy objectives in order to better understand the evolution of American attitudes towards foreign intervention.

### Truman Doctrine

Following the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Cold War, President Truman quickly began to believe that it would be against the interests of the United States to retreat back to its isolationist policies of the past. Several of his closest advisors had begun to outline the "domino theory," based on the premise that an entire region would fall to communism once one country in the area came under its influence. On March 12th, 1947, Truman gave a speech to a joint session of congress to address his new policy, stating:

> "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support the free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way. I believe that our

> help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."[98]

The policy was formulated largely in response to the Turkish Straits crisis, in which the Soviets were pressuring the Turkey to allow Russian ships free passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and the communist uprising in Greece.[99] The Truman Doctrine was also a manifestation of the fear of a "geopolitical pincer movement" on the part of the Russians to control the Middle East's oil giants and supply lines, both of which were viewed as critical to the future of the American economy.[100] Its focus was on the containment of communism, mainly by preventing its spread to Europe, by utilizing the economic capacity (as opposed to military force) of the United States to stabilize potentially vulnerable regions.

Eisenhower Doctrine

On July 26th, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, stripping both the United Kingdom and France of their majority ownership of the valuable passageway. By late October, Israel, France and the U.K. had deployed troops to the region to recapture the canal and depose Nasser. However, President Eisenhower strongly condemned the intervention just a few days later, largely due to concerns over a potential Soviet intervention and its condemnation of their invasion of Hungary just a few days earlier.[101] The crisis resulted in the

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[98] "PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947." *Avalon Project*. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, n.d. Web. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp>.

[99] "PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, MARCH 12, 1947." *Avalon Project*. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, n.d. Web. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp>.

[100] Painter, David S. "Oil and the American Century." *The Journal of American History* (2012): 24-39. *Organization of American Historians*. Web. <https://academic-oup-com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/jah/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/jahist/jas073>.

[101] "The Suez Crisis, 1956." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

formulation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which articulated a policy of providing both military and economic assistance to any Middle Eastern nations resisting communism. In his January 5th, 1957 address to congress, Eisenhower articulated the three pillars of his doctrine as: (1) the "development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence," (2) the authorization of "the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid," and (3) to "include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."[102] This marked a departure from Truman in that Eisenhower was willing to commit the U.S. military to foreign conflicts in an attempt to contain the spread of Soviet influence.

Kennedy Doctrine

Kennedy's foreign policy represented an extension of Eisenhower's to the Western Hemisphere in response to the Cuban Revolution. In his inaugural address, Kennedy articulated his policy by stating: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."[103] Despite it being a relatively short speech, Kennedy also

[102] Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Eisenhower Doctrine." 5 Jan. 1957. Web. <https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/education/bsa/citizenship_merit_badge/speeches_national_historical_importance/eisenhower_doctrine.pdf>.
[103] "Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy." *John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum*. N.p., 21 Jan. 1961. Web. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx>.

dedicated a portion to "our sister republics south of our border" to make the same commitment to them that Eisenhower made to the Middle Eastern states.[104]

Johnson Doctrine

Similar to Kennedy, President Johnson's foreign policy represents only a simple extension of his predecessor's doctrine. Johnson made a televised address to the American public following the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republican in 1965 and stated that revolution in any country "becomes a matter calling for hemispheric action only – repeat – only when the object is the establishment of a communistic dictatorship."[105] In many ways, the Johnson Doctrine does not represent any policy shift in the United States; its importance, however, stems from its explicit continuation of containment as an imperative of American foreign policy.

Nixon Doctrine

When Nixon came into office, the United States had already been engaged in Vietnam for several years and public sentiment had begun to turn against the war. Early on in his presidency (1969), Nixon made a trip to Guam and during an interview with a reporter, stated that "as far as the problem of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations

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[104] "Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy." *John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum*. N.p., 21 Jan. 1961. Web. <https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx>.

[105] Johnson, Lyndon B. "221 - Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican Republic." *The American Presidency Project*. N.p., 2 May 1965. Web. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26932>.

themselves."[106] In essence, Nixon was actually backing down from his predecessors' unmitigated commitment to any "free" nation's defense. He stopped short of withdrawing the United States' invitation of admission to the nuclear umbrella for any nation resisting Soviet influence.

Later that year, during his *Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam*, Nixon articulated a more robust doctrine built on three explicit pillars to define the limitations of American engagement abroad:

> "First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."[107]

This is widely regarded to be Nixon's articulation of a new policy of *Vietnamization*, which advocated for South Vietnam to take command of the war there in the same vein as the modern French policy of Europeanization.

Carter Doctrine

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 meant that Nixon's de-escalation from the unconditional support of previous administrations was short lived. President Carter, concerned by the presence of Russian troops so close to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, decided to unveil his own doctrine meant to deter the Soviet Union from seeking any greater influence in the region. In his 1980 State of the Union address to Congress, Carter introduced his own doctrine calling for the multilateral support of any nation that "[relies] on oil from the Middle

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[106] Nixon, Richard. "79 - Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen." *The American Presidency Project*. N.p., 25 July 1969. Web. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>.
[107] Nixon, Richard. "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam." 3 Nov. 1969. *Nixon Library*. Web. <https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forkids/speechesforkids/silentmajority/silentmajority_transcript.pdf>.

East and who are concerned with global peace and stability" by announcing, "Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[108] Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, extended the doctrine to apply specifically to the United States' continued commitment to Saudi Arabia following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War.[109] Once again, military action was being promised as a tool for the policy of containment that had defined Washington policies since Truman.

Reagan Doctrine

After Carter, American presidents became less willing to articulate a strict doctrine that would define their foreign policy initiatives, leading to a pattern of examining presidents' public statements and the actions they took abroad. For example, "the Reagan Doctrine" first appeared as a phrase in a 1985 essay in *Time* magazine.[110] Regardless, President Reagan's foreign policy marked a decisive shift away from the containment and de-escalation policies of his predecessors and instead focused on the "roll back" of Soviet influence across the globe. In his 1985 State of the Union address, Reagan argued that "we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives… to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth… Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and… I want to work with you to support the

[108] Carter, Jimmy. "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress. - January 23, 1980." *The American Presidency Project*. N.p., 23 Jan. 1980. Web.
[109] Teicher, Howard and Gayle Radley Teicher. *Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush*. New York: Morrow, 1993. pp. 145-146.
[110] Krauthammer, Charles. "The Reagan Doctrine." *Time*. Time Inc., 24 June 2001. Web. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,141478,00.html>.

democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own security."[111] The shift occurred due to a growing consensus that victory in the Cold War could be more easily achieved by confronting the Soviets indirectly through their proxies and allies, which they could no longer afford to support. The policy was also much less expensive for the United States, both in terms of operational objectives and the lack of American casualties. The Reagan Doctrine lasted through the administration of President George H.W. Bush, Reagan's Vice President.

Clinton Doctrine

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was tasked with developing a new set of objectives for its interactions with the international community. President Clinton was the first to confront this and developed a policy of limited interventions based on an individual situation's threat to both American values and interests. In February of 1999, Clinton gave a speech on foreign policy in San Francisco that articulated his vision for American interventions abroad:

> "It's easy, for example, to say that we really have no interest in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of Africa or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread? We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so. And we must remember that the real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with problems before they harm our national interests."[112]

While not as explicit in stating either the objectives of American policy or the catalysts that would force American intervention, the Clinton Doctrine for the first time included the concept

[111] Reagan, Ronald. "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union." *The American Presidency Project*. N.p., 6 Feb. 1985. Web.
[112] Clinton, William J. "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco." *The American Presidency Project*. N.p., 26 Feb. 1999. Web.

of humanitarian intervention into a presidential prerogative, as well as set the stage for future pre-emptive interventions. For Clinton, there were two categories of interests that would force the United States to intervene. The first are national interests that "do not affect our national survival, but… do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live."[113] The second category is humanitarian interests, which would compel the United States to intervene because "our values demand it."[114] The list of examples the *National Security Strategy* paper gives for each category remain important considerations in American foreign policy decisions to this day.

Bush Doctrine

The terror attacks in Washington D.C. and New York City on September 11th, 2001 came to define not just President George W. Bush's foreign policy, but his entire presidency. However, like both Clinton and Reagan, Bush never made an explicit declaration of his foreign policy doctrine while in office. Instead, several documents from Bush's time in office and his own memoirs provide the necessary insight for the formulation of a Bush Doctrine. The Bush administration's *National Security Strategy* essay in 2002 is one such document. In the essay, four themes stand out as the driving forces behind President Bush's foreign policy: preemption, military primacy, a "new" multilateralism, and the spread of democracy.[115] In his memoir, *Decision Points*, President Bush details the four key elements of his strategy, three realistic and one idealistic. Bush implemented a strategy for the United States to "make no distinction between the terrorists and the nations that harbor them," to "take the fight to the enemy overseas

[113] *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Rep. N.p.: The White House, 1999. Print. p 1.
[114] *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Rep. N.p.: The White House, 1999. Print. p 2.
[115] Lieber, Keir A., and Robert J. Lieber. "The Bush National Security Strategy." *Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State* 7.4 (2002): 32-35. Web.

before they can attack us," to "confront threats before they fully materialize," and to "advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy's ideology of repression and fear."[116] The doctrine is regarded as a neoconservative realist one, advocating for the promotion of democracy around the world, through unilateral action if necessary. It marked a dramatic departure from the underlying influences of the Clinton Doctrine, with critics arguing that the policy claimed "the self-validating right to wage wars of choice… [and] promote a political and economic system deemed a universal template."[117] While ostensibly still applicable towards humanitarian missions, the Bush Doctrine directly targeted terror organizations and mostly dropped the aspects of liberalism that defined Clinton's policy.

Obama Doctrine

President Obama's foreign policy represents an especially difficult case in that at no point did he choose to clearly articulate any set of foundational pillars for making a decision to take action abroad. Obama himself, during one of the Democratic Presidential Debates during the 2008 primary season, argued that "I think one of the things about the Obama doctrine is it's not going to be as doctrinaire as the Bush doctrine, because the world is complicated."[118] At a later point during the campaign, Obama outlined his foreign policy strategy by listing five goals: "getting out of Iraq and on to the right battlefield in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing the capabilities and partnerships we need to take out the terrorists and the world's most deadly weapons; engaging the world to dry up support for terror and extremism; restoring our values;

[116] Bush, George W. *Decision points*. New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2011. Print. p 396-397.
[117] Meyer, Karl E. "America Unlimited: The Radical Sources of the Bush Doctrine." *World Policy Journal* 21.1 (2004): 1-13. *Duke University Press*. Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209897>. p 1.
[118] "Democratic Presidential Debate on NPR." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 03 Dec. 2007. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/us/politics/04transcript-debate.html?pagewanted=7>.

and securing a more resilient homeland."[119] Inevitably, however, the international landscape changed dramatically during Obama's presidency. The Arab Spring revolts that began in late 2010 led to protests and civil wars across the Muslim world, in both the Middle East and North Africa.

The combination of these revolts and other events necessitated Obama to develop a broader and less goal-specific policy for determining international actions. In April 2016, *The Atlantic* published a long essay by Jeffrey Goldberg in which the author combed through his several interviews Obama and his policy advisors in an attempt to piece together the Obama Doctrine. In one these interviews Obama created a "four-box grid representing the main schools of American foreign-policy thought:" isolationism, realism, liberal interventionism, and internationalism.[120] The president described himself as both a realist and internationalist due to his belief that the United States "can't, at given moment, relieve all the world's misery," and his devotion to "strengthening multilateral organizations and international norms."[121] He also understands that the United States, despite its inability to solve every international issue, must be the country to "set the agenda, [or] it doesn't happen."[122] These thoughts, according to Goldberg, helped to define Obama's policy as one of retrenchment, "pulling back, spending less, cutting risk, and shifting burdens to allies," becoming less interventionist unless he decides a "particular

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[119] Obama, Barack. "Obama's Speech at Woodrow Wilson Center." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Council on Foreign Relations, 01 Aug. 2007. Web. <http://www.cfr.org/elections/obamas-speech-woodrow-wilson-center/p13974>.
[120] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 17 Mar. 2016. Web. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.
[121] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 17 Mar. 2016. Web. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.
[122] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 17 Mar. 2016. Web. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.

challenge [to] represent a direct national-security threat."[123] For all the contradictions in President Obama's thought processes, the underlying policy of his doctrine appears to be a willingness to intervene, with force if necessary, when America's core national security or interests are threatened, but a reliance on international support and norms in situations that fail to meet that threshold.

**Other Doctrines**

Besides American presidents, several of their closest advisors have developed their own doctrines for justifying American actions abroad that have significantly influenced the American foreign policy establishment since the end of World War II.

Kirkpatrick Doctrine

Jeane Kirkpatrick was appointed the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 1981 to 1985 by Ronald Reagan. The doctrine she developed was used to justify American support for "pro-Western" dictatorships around the globe during the Reagan administration's "roll-back" of communist states. In her essay "Dictatorships & Double Standards," Kirkpatrick lobbied for the continued American support of "traditional authoritarian governments" on the basis that they "are less repressive than revolutionary autocracies, that they are more susceptible of liberalization, and that they are more compatible with U.S. interests."[124] The basic tenant of her argument was that the totalitarian regimes birthed by communist revolutionaries create significant domestic problems through their claim of "jurisdiction over the whole of life of the

[123] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 17 Mar. 2016. Web. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.
[124] Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Dictatorships & Double Standards." *World Affairs* 170.2 (2007): 61-73. *Sage Publications, Inc.* Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672794>. p 72.

society," whereas traditional autocrats merely "tolerate" existing issues and inequalities and make no effort to improve the lives of their people.[125] The Kirkpatrick Doctrine was used to justify the support of military regimes across the globe in an attempt to prevent the rise of communist states in those regions, but is often criticized for being morally hypocritical in the application of its intended desire for both human rights and democracy.

Weinberger Doctrine

Caspar Weinberger, another prominent Reagan appointee,[126] developed a doctrine dictating the use of military force that was created to avoid future entanglements like the Vietnam War. Unlike many of the presidential doctrines, the Weinberger doctrine is an explicit list of when the United States should and should not commit forces abroad:

> (1) "The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
> (2) "If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all."
> (3) "We should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives."
> (4) "The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed – their size, composition and disposition – must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."
> (5) "Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress."
> (6) "The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort."[127]

This doctrine was designed to force American leaders to acknowledge their policy objectives and the realities of the situation and the United States' ability to influence that situation before

[125] Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Dictatorships & Double Standards." *World Affairs* 170.2 (2007): 61-73. *Sage Publications, Inc.* Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672794>. p 72.
[126] Secretary of Defense from 1981 - 1987
[127] Weinberger, Caspar W. "The Uses of Military Power." *PBS*. Public Broadcasting Service, 28 Nov. 1984. Web. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html>.

committing forces abroad. It was also designed to protect American credibility by deterring presidents and other policy-makers from making statements that the United States would not then enforce if the stated conditions were met.

Powell Doctrine

Finally, there is the doctrine named after General Colin Powell, which expands upon the Weinberger Doctrine is creating a series of eight tests that must be met before the commitment of military forces abroad:

> "1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
> 2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
> 3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
> 4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?
> 5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
> 6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
> 7. Is the action supported by the American people?
> 8. Do we have genuine broad international support?"[128]

Though not an extreme leap from Weinberger, the Powell Doctrine was an attempt to simplify the questions that Weinberger asked and to "curb the well-intentioned but naïve desire for global-do-gooding that has inspired American liberal interventionists for decades."[129] The doctrine has been described as a realist one that narrowly defines vital national security interests, attempts to limit the use American military forces to keep them rested, and increases the likelihood of future international support.

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[128] Walt, Stephen M. "Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria." *Foreign Policy*. N.p., 03 Sept. 2013. Web. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/03/applying-the-8-questions-of-the-powell-doctrine-to-syria/>.

[129] Walt, Stephen M. "Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria." *Foreign Policy*. N.p., 03 Sept. 2013. Web. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/03/applying-the-8-questions-of-the-powell-doctrine-to-syria/>.

**Main Theories Underpinning American Policy**

As useful as the foreign policy doctrines of American presidents and other policy-makers are for understanding the evolution of American involvement on the international stage, each is based on a few foundational theories that better describe American willingness to intervene in foreign countries since the end of World War II.

Containment

This policy, first developed by an employee of the State Department in the Moscow Embassy, George F. Kennan, argued for the United States to prevent the further spread of communism after a series of expansionist moves by the Soviet Union following the end of the Second World War. It became a main tenant of United States policy from the time of Truman's presidency through the Carter administration and directly influenced the decision to intervene in several conflicts, including the both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

Détente

Originally a French term, détente refers to the easing, or de-escalation, of tensions between two or more parties and is typically applied to political relationships. As it applies to American foreign policy, détente was embraced after the failure of the Vietnam War to contain the advance of communism and the political fallout that followed. The policy is typically ascribed to Nixon and Ford, and is associated with both multilateral and bilateral arms control agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation and SALT treaties.[130]

[130] "Détente and Arms Control, 1969–1979." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/detente>.

Roll Back

Discussed briefly in the Reagan Doctrine section, "roll back" refers to a more aggressive policy than either détente or containment and advocates for the active use any necessary measures to force major changes in the strategies of an adversary. It is most commonly associated with Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, who pursued a policy of weakening Soviet influence in satellite states by supporting rebel movements more aligned with U.S. interests. The goal was to diminish Soviet influence across the globe and prevent the further adoption of communism by other nations.

Humanitarianism

A more recent installment of American foreign policy, humanitarianism refers to the policy of the use of "military force (publicly stated that its use is for ending the violation of human rights) against another state."[131] It differs from other policies for three reasons, beyond simply aiming for different objectives not related to victory in the Cold War. First, this policy explicitly involves "the threat and employment of military force,"[132] as opposed to other diplomatic and economic channels of state-to-state interaction applied by the other theories. Second, it represents intervention "in the sense that it entails sending military forces across the sovereign borders or into the sovereign airspace of another country that has not committed international 'aggression' against another state."[133] Third, it entails the use of force in "situations

[131] Marjanovic, Marko. "Is Humanitarian War the Exception?" *Mises Institute*. N.p., 28 Mar. 2011. Web. <https://mises.org/library/humanitarian-war-exception>.
[132] Frye, Alton. *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*. Rep. N.p.: Council on Foreign Relationships, 2000. Print. p 3.
[133] Frye, Alton. *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*. Rep. N.p.: Council on Foreign Relationships, 2000. Print. p 4.

that do not pose direct, immediate threats to U.S. strategic 'interests.'"[134] Instead, this policy is a values-oriented one that its proponents use as validation for intervening to protect innocent civilians from human rights abuses by more powerful actors. It has historically been espoused by Democratic politicians in the United States.

Counterterrorism

The terror attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon (as well as the downed plane in Pennsylvania) on September 11th, 2001 ensured the permanent U.S. adoption of counterterror policies into its foreign policy. The primary example is the Bush Doctrine, formulated in direct response to those attacks and used to justify American interventions in not only Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in other nations with a strong presence of terror organizations. However, the Bush administration's policies came under severe criticism as the American public's tolerance for two long wars and the high costs, in terms of both economic and human casualties, associated with their continuation. A report released by the Brookings Institute criticized the Bush Doctrine for its "overemphasizing [of] tactics at the expense of strategy… for reducing the appeal of jihad."[135] The report, released in 2008, argues that the Bush administration reorganized "virtually" all of the United States' foreign and security policy to be viewed through the lens of counterterrorism, rather than incorporating counterterror operations into a greater U.S. strategy.[136] That policy changed somewhat during Obama's presidency. During an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, Obama said that he does not view terror groups like ISIS as an "existential threat" to the United States in the same way that climate change or a nuclear-armed

[134] Frye, Alton. *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*. Rep. N.p.: Council on Foreign Relationships, 2000. Print. p 4.
[135] Benjamin, Daniel. *Strategic Counterterrorism*. Rep. N.p.: Brookings Institute, 2008. Print. p 2.
[136] Benjamin, Daniel. *Strategic Counterterrorism*. Rep. N.p.: Brookings Institute, 2008. Print. p 2.

Iran do.[137] He uses this separate classification as a justification for his decision not to increase America's presence in Syria and also for his more dedicated focus on other international issues during his presidency. It remains to be seen whether President Trump will follow suit, but following his attempts at instituting a "travel-ban" against refugees and immigrants from several Muslim-majority countries, it appears that counterterrorism is once again being used as the lens through which to view many of the United States' foreign policy objectives.

**American Interventions in Africa: 1945 – 2017**

Between 1950 and 2010, there were over 40 "instances of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Africa, according to a report prepared by an analyst for the Congressional Research Service; however, only twelve of these occurred during the Cold War period from 1950 – 1991.[138] The list details the presence of American military forces on the ground in at least 19 different African nations across the continent[139] and do not include other methods of intervention, such as the support for several different factions involved in the Angolan Civil War during the Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. For a full list and description of these interventions, see Figure C in the Appendix, which is an excerpt from the CRS report.

Since 2010, the United States has maintained a continued presence on the continent with operations in several different nations supporting counterterror and United Nations' operations.

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[137] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 17 Mar. 2016. Web. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.
[138] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.
[139] Egypt, Congo, Zaire, Libya, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Central African Republic, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia; Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.

The most notable of these would be the United States' involvement in the air campaign during the Libyan Civil War following the popular revolt against Muammar Gaddafi.

**American Strategic Interests in Africa**

Much like France, the United States' interests in Africa are diverse and concern not just a wide variety of nations, but of issues as well. To best understand how U.S. interests on the continent differ from those of France, this section will once again divide the strategic interests into the three categories of political, economic, and security and defense.

Political

American political interests in Africa take on three distinct forms: the rhetorical obligation to act against humanitarian crises, the incentive to form working relationships with African governments to promote stability and diminish the power of terror organizations, and, to a lesser extent, the need to "remain watchful toward other countries' growing influence on the continent."[140] Humanitarian interventions have long posed a political problem for American presidents, despite their relatively unrestricted ability to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the nation. For several decades, American foreign policy rhetoric has espoused a moral obligation to intervene not only in cases of genocide, but also in any situation where innocent civilians suffer from oppression at the hands of an authoritarian regime or from the effects of a lack of economic stability and development. Public support for these types of interventions has been less consistent. In the case of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, a CBS News poll that asked whether the United States should intervene to "stop the killing in Rwanda" resulted in 61% of

[140] Meservey, Joshua. "Four U.S. Policy Priorities for Africa in 2016." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 5 Jan. 2016. Web. <http://www.heritage.org/africa/report/four-us-policy-priorities-africa-2016>.

respondents opposed to the idea.[141] Part of this can be explained by the political context of the event. The American intervention in Somalia in 1992, specifically the fallout from the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton become much more hesitant to deploy American troops abroad for humanitarian reasons.[142] It is this precarious line that U.S. presidents must navigate when deciding to act upon the loftier elements of American rhetoric. President Obama's reticence to enforce his "red line" in Syria was also due, in part, to American war fatigue.

The second political interest for the United States in Africa has been to form good working relationships with African governments to better aid in establishing economic stability, peace, and the influence of terrorist organizations on the conflict. This interest is closely aligned with the United States' economic and security interests on the continent and it will be discussed more thoroughly in those sections. The main point is that American politicians have a political incentive to promote these relationships, beyond their purely economic and defense benefits.

Finally, there is a growing concern among some foreign policy analysts that growing Chinese influence on the continent threatens to prevent the United States from successfully accomplishing its own goals there. Chinese interests in the continent are primarily economic – China passed the United States as the continent's largest trading partner in 2009 and has significantly increased its pledged aid support in recent years.[143] One example of U.S. concern was the impact China had on finally forcing the Sudanese to allow a referendum on South

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[141] Malone, Clare. "America's Fickle Relationship With Humanitarian Intervention." *FiveThirtyEight*. FiveThirtyEight, 10 Apr. 2017. Web. <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americas-fickle-relationship-with-humanitarian-intervention/>.

[142] Clarke, Walter, and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 75.2 (1996): 70. Web.

[143] Meservey, Joshua. "Four U.S. Policy Priorities for Africa in 2016." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 15 Jan. 2016. Web. <http://www.heritage.org/africa/report/four-us-policy-priorities-africa-2016>.

Sudan's independence and to stop the genocide in Darfur.[144] Before Chinese President Hu Jintao "made a critical visit to Sudan… that resulted in Sudan's reluctant acceptance" of UN peacekeeping force, the issue had previously stymied American efforts at a solution.[145] Recent deals between African states and Russian state-owned companies have also raised some concern.[146] For these, reasons, many policy analysts have advocated for a greater American presence on the continent.

Economic

The CRS report mentioned in the previous section, entitled *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, denotes five major U.S. interests on the continent. Primary among them is the continent's importance to oil and global trade. In 2011, when the report was released, oil exports from Africa to the United States made up "roughly the same amount… as the Middle East," which has historically been regarded as a region crucial to American interests because of concerns over energy dependency; additionally, "trade between the United States and Africa… tripled" between 1990 and 2011.[147] In 2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States was slightly over $8 billion, or about 9% of the total FDI inflows to Africa that year.[148] These investments remain highly fragmented and

[144] Shinn, David H. "China and the Conflict in Darfur." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 16.1 (2009): 85-100. Web.
[145] Shinn, David H. "China and the Conflict in Darfur." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 16.1 (2009): 85-100. Web.
[146] Meservey, Joshua. "Four U.S. Policy Priorities for Africa in 2016." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 15 Jan. 2016. Web. <http://www.heritage.org/africa/report/four-us-policy-priorities-africa-2016>.
[147] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.
[148] Zhan, James X, et al. *World Investment Report 2015*. Rep. N.p.: United Nations Publication, 2015.*United Nations Investment Report*. United Nations, 2015.

are concentrated in a few key countries, however.[149] Maritime security remains another priority for the United States in the region. This is born out of a concern for global energy security, protecting high-volume trade routes from Somalian pirates, and preventing the increased use of drug trafficking routes through Western Africa into Europe.[150] Finally, the recent "global slump" of commodity prices has presented a significant challenge to many African economies that rely upon the export of oil and other minerals as their main source of income.[151] This also poses a security threat due to the destabilizing element it poses to fragile economies.

Security and Defense

The last set of American interests in Africa pertain to stability, security and defense. The presence of several terrorist groups, such as Boko Haram (Nigeria), Al-Shabaab (Somalia and Kenya), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), ISIS (Libya), and several other less high-profile groups, all continue to act as a destabilizing force in the region. A few of these groups also pose a threat to American citizens on the continent and even have the capacity to plan and execute attacks on American soil. Attacks against American embassies remain an infrequent, but justifiable concern following the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the Benghazi attacks in 2012 that started a political firestorm. The continent continues to experience "political conflict and instability… [that] have caused human suffering on a massive scale and have undermined economic, social, and political development."[152] Of the sixteen ongoing

[149] See Appendix Figure D
[150] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.
[151] Meservey, Joshua. "Four U.S. Policy Priorities for Africa in 2016." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 15 Jan. 2016. Web. <http://www.heritage.org/africa/report/four-us-policy-priorities-africa-2016>.
[152] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.

peacekeeping operations led by the UN, nine are in Africa[153], which represents a fifty-percent increase over the number of peacekeeping operations in 2011.[154] Both political and terrorist violence threaten to increase the number of failed states on the continent, which have been identified as an "acute risk to U.S. national security, [by] providing a potential 'safe have' for terrorists, [who also] profit from the limited capacity of state administrative and security institutions."[155]

[153] Meservey, Joshua. "Four U.S. Policy Priorities for Africa in 2016." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 15 Jan. 2016. Web. <http://www.heritage.org/africa/report/four-us-policy-priorities-africa-2016>.
[154] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.
[155] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.

# IV. Intervention Case Studies

**French Interventions**

Côte d'Ivoire – 2002

In the mid-1990's, during the fallout from the situation in Rwanda, French policy in Africa looked dramatically different. Not only did the failure of the French to decisively intervene against the genocide there severely diminish France's reputation in its area of influence, but their inability to prevent the overthrow of Mobutu in Zaire made it clear that the French capacity to successfully intervene had been severely diminished. No longer was it politically popular, or even viable, for the French head of state to pursue a highly interventionist policy in the region.

With the turn of the millennium came even more disappointment. On December 24th, 1999, Côte d'Ivoire suffered a military coup and President Henri Konan-Bédié was ousted from office. The impetus for the intervention were measures put in place by Bédié that severely limited the "definition of Ivorian identity on the requirements to run for political office, effectively excluding the main opposition leader, Alassane Ouattara, who was from Mali, from running for president."[156] [157] Due to the unpopularity of any action in the region at the time, French leadership declined to intervene, despite France's strong history of cooperation with Ivorian leadership since decolonization. The military regime remained in power until early 2001, successfully managing to defeat seven additional coup attempts. In 2001, General Gueï, the

[156] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.
[157] Gregory, Shaun. "The French Military In Africa: Past And Present." *African Affairs* 99.396 (2000): 435-48. Web.

leader of the initial coup, yielded to political pressure and stepped down to allow a new president, Laurent Gbagbo, to assume control of the country.[158]

Racial tensions, the original cause for the 1999 coup, boiled over once again in 2002. Having become one of the wealthier and more stable nations to emerge in West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire had attracted a significant number of African foreigners who made up 26% of the country's population. Many had come from the neighboring country of Burkina Faso, took up residence in the north, and a significant portion practiced Islam rather than Christianity, the majority religion in the south and capital city of Abidjan.[159] However, the political context in France had changed. The traditionally conservative party of President Chirac achieved a "major victory" earlier that year.[160] Therefore, when violence broke out in Côte d'Ivoire, Chirac was successfully able to acquire the political backing for a French intervention in the former colony. As the new defense minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, wrote, intervention was needed to stabilize a country whose breakup could "call into question numerous African borders, provoke a general destabilization in West Africa, a shockwave across the entire continent, and a wave of uncontrollable immigration to Europe."[161]

In September 2002, Opération Lincorne[162] was authorized by the French government and launched in Côte d'Ivoire. French forces quickly took control of the situation and set up a cease-

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[158] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.
[159] Skogseth, Geir. "Côte d'Ivoire: Ethnicity, Ivoirité and Conflict." *Land Info* (2006): 1-35. Print. p 9.
[160] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.
[161] "la remise en cause de nombreuses frontières africains, provoquent une déstabilisation généralisée de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, une onde de choc sur l'ensemble du continent, et des flux d'émigration incontrôlables vers l'Europe." Alliot-Marie, Michèle. *Le chêne qu'on relève*. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 2005. Print. p 33.
[162] Defense, Ministry of. *Dossier de Presse: Fin de l'opération Licorne*. Rep. Paris: n.p., 2015. Print.

fire line to create a North-South border between forces loyal to the government in Abidjan and the rebels.[163] By early 2003, the French had secured a UN Security Council resolution in favor of the intervention, which also set up a UN peacekeeping mission,[164] and received support from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[165] On October 17th, 2002, the involved parties each agreed to a cease-fire that would be monitored by French and ECOWAS soldiers.[166] During this time, the situation on the ground remained extremely volatile, with intermittent fighting taking place between 2003 and 2007.

In 2010, four years after the two sides had signed an agreement to hold a presidential election, fighting broke out once again. Both President Gbagbo and his opponent, Alassane Ouattara, claimed victory. An independent electoral commission declared Ouattara the victor and several outside groups, including the UN, U.S., France, EU, AU, and ECOWAS all called for Gbagbo to step down.[167] After he refused, pro-Ouattara forces launched an offensive, with the partial support of French and UN forces. Gbagbo was arrested after the Battle of Abidjan on April 11th, 2011.[168]

In this case, France intervened to bring stability against an internal crisis. The major justification for French intervention beyond the implications of a failed Côte d'Ivoire for regional stability, however, was mostly to protect and evacuate French expatriates, who

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[163] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web. p 29.
[164] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1479, *The situation in Côte d'Ivoire*. S/RES/1479 (May 13, 2003) available from http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1479.
[165] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web.
[166] Defense, Ministry of. *Dossier de Presse: Fin de l'opération Licorne*. Rep. Paris: n.p., 2015. Print.
[167] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/22/ivory-coast-death-squads
[168] Defense, Ministry of. *Dossier de Presse: Fin de l'opération Licorne*. Rep. Paris: n.p., 2015. Print.

numbered somewhere around 16,000.[169] Arguments still take place over whether the French viewed this intervention as one against internal or external aggression – the racial tensions that unleashed the violence had significant implications for Burkina Faso and Mali, due to the large number of their citizens in Côte d'Ivoire, and both governments are rumored to have supported the rebel groups.[170] The intervention also served to rebuild France's credibility as a security guarantor within its area of influence on the continent. Many view the French intervention as a "strategically needed to remain a major power in Africa."[171]

Mali – 2013

Mali has never been a fully pacified nation – at least not since the country achieved independence in 1960. The Tuareg, a confederation of several different (though related) ethnic groups, were disappointed with the lack of a creation of their own state during decolonization and several different groups have led revolts and caused intermittent periods of violence ever since. In early 2012, a Tuareg rebel group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), launched an offensive in Northern Mali. Displeased with the government's provision of "adequate equipment and resources for the troops fighting in the north," a dissident group within the Malian Army, led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, staged a coup d'état against President Amadou Touré on March 21st.[172] The power vacuum left behind by the coup reinvigorated rebel groups, who by this point included terror groups Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

[169] Defense, Ministry of. *Dossier de Presse: Fin de l'opération Licorne*. Rep. Paris: n.p., 2015. Print.
[170] Christian Bouquet, *Géopolitique de la Côte d'Ivoire : le désespoir de Kourouma* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), 110-111.
[171] Griffin, Christopher. *French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization*. University of Southern California School of International Relations, 3 Mar. 2007. Web. p 32.
[172] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 123.

Maghreb (AQIM).[173] The army failed to improve its performance in the war and Timbuktu fell to the rebels on April 1st, 2012.[174] The coup was quickly condemned by the international community and the junta's leaders agreed to cede control to an interim civilian government on April 6th, though the new government was reported to be significantly influenced by coup leaders, which further led to an ineffective response to the ongoing crisis.[175]

On December 20th, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a multinational African military force to maintain the peace in Mali by enforcing a cease-fire that would require the two sides reconcile with one another.[176] However, this force would not be ready until September 2013, prompting the rebels to resume their assault before the AU force could be organized. French defense and intelligence sources, believing the rebels ready to launch a final assault on the capital of Bamako, pressed President Hollande to intervene in order to prevent "the Sahel from becoming a safe haven for terrorists."[177] After trading drafts of a letter requesting French aid in preventing further rebel progress with the head of the transitional government, Dioncounda Traoré, Hollande authorized Operation Serval on January 11th, 2013, despite campaigning as vehemently anti-interventionist during the French presidential election.[178] The operation formally combined 4,000 French troops and 2,000 Chadians and lasted until the merger of Operations Serval and Epervier on August 1st, 2014 into a "much larger regional

[173] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 123.
[174] "Malian coup leaders restore constitution." *Al Jazeera*. N.p., 1 Apr. 2012. Web.
[175] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 124.
[176] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 124.
[177] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 125.
[178] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 125.

operation, Barkhane… recasted French military actions across the region as a wide-ranging counter-terrorism operation targeting Islamists extremists with a mandate to operate across borders."[179] Two other operations, AFISMA by the African Union and MINUSMA by the UN,[180] assembled troops from various other African nations to support the French and keep the peace.

The French decision to intervene in Mali demonstrates several key facts about French policy in Africa. The first is that France prioritizes regional stability above all else. The success of the Tuareg Rebellion was a regionally destabilizing factor given that, like almost every other ethnic group indigenous to Africa, the Tuareg had their peoples divided up among several different territories during the periods of colonization and decolonization's nation construction.[181] Because the Tuareg were also supported by terror groups like Ansar Dine and AQIM, the loss of territory during the rebellion meant more space for "Islamists and the prevalence of criminal activities, from drug running to people trafficking and kidnapping of westerners."[182] As mentioned several chapters ago, France extracts 30% of its uranium used for domestic nuclear energy production, which makes ensuring safety in the region a top national security priority. Additionally, this intervention demonstrated France's dedication to assuring its role as a global power and fulfilling its international responsibilities. Importantly, the French did not intervene in Mali until international support had been established and the likelihood of any decisive multilateral action had gone down. This shows a shift in French policy from initially relying upon unilateral action to a policy that at least makes initial overtures for a more

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[179] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 127.
[180] African-led International Support Mission to Mali; United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali; Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 126.
[181] See Appendix Figure E
[182] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 130.

international response. Finally, this intervention represents the ongoing difficulty the French have had with rejecting the history of françafrique. While the French no longer rely on the rhetoric of recalling France's colonial legacy and its continuing relationships in the region, the asymmetric nature of their new '*partnership*' with African nations continues to mean that the French take the military lead and subordinate "the commitment to human rights and democracy" to geopolitical concerns.[183]

**American Interventions**

Somalia – 1992

Following its independence and unification in 1960, Somalia experienced a military coup in 1969 that established Mohamed Siad Barre as the Somalian president.[184] Barre ruled for nearly two decades as a dictator favoring his own clan and those of his mother and son-in-law. This favoritism engendered increasing antagonism towards his regime and several different clan-based, rebel groups successfully ousted Barre from Mogadishu, the capital, in January 1991.[185] These groups quickly turned on each other in the power vacuum that emerged and with no clear central government, the country "descended into chaos, and a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions."[186] The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 751 in April 1992, establishing UN oversight of a cease-fire. The resolution quickly proved ineffective at preventing further violence. Media coverage of the crisis as intense. Photographs of starving children flooded

[183] Chafer, Tony. "France in Mali: Towards a new Africa strategy?" *International Journal of Francophone Studies* 19.2 (2016): 119-41. Print. p 132.
[184] "Somalia, 1992–1993." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia>.
[185] "Somalia, 1992–1993." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia>.
[186] "Somalia, 1992–1993." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia>.

American television and news broadcaster Tom Brokaw told his viewers, "It's a place where a thousand die today, and a thousand will die tomorrow, and the day after that, and the day after that."[187] By December, President George H.W. Bush launched Operation Restore Hope as part of the UN United Task Force (UNITAF) to protect aid deliveries that were being disrupted primarily by warlord Muhammad Farah Aideed.[188] When President Bush announced the operation, American public support for the troop deployment was 66%.[189] By March 1993, this force had been reclassified as UNISOM II. Following the Battle of Mogadishu on October 3rd, 1993, in which 18 American soldiers were killed, President Bill Clinton withdrew American combat troops from the country and published Presidential Decision Directive 25. This directive "outlined a series of factors which the national security bureaucracy must consider before involving the United States in peacekeeping."[190]

Determining the direct American interests justifying intervening in Somalia is somewhat difficult. Public support was obviously in favor of deploying troops and intense media coverage of the humanitarian crisis played directly into American rhetoric and values. Fear of a failed state leading to an increased presence of terror groups was less significant at the time, as this event occurred before the attacks on September 11th, 2001. Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated that the U.S. intervened essentially because "it was right and because it

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[187] Strong, Robert. "Why the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992 was an occasion for thanksgiving." *Newsweek*. N.p., 28 Nov. 2016. Web. <http://www.newsweek.com/somalias-1992-thanksgiving-reflections-us-humanitarian-intervention-horn-523887>.

[188] "Somalia, 1992–1993." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia>.

[189] Malone, Clare. "America's Fickle Relationship With Humanitarian Intervention." *FiveThirtyEight*. FiveThirtyEight, 10 Apr. 2017. Web. <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americas-fickle-relationship-with-humanitarian-intervention/>.

[190] "Somalia, 1992–1993." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/somalia>.

could."[191] Even after the Battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton made overtures along the same lines:

> "We went because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time. A third of a million people had died of starvation and disease. Twice that many more were at risk of dying. Meanwhile, tons of relief supplies piled up in the capital of Mogadishu because a small number of Somalis stopped food from reaching their own countrymen. Our consciences said 'enough.'"[192]

Clinton also mentioned that to leave Somalia immediately following the first sign of adversity would only damage American credibility and undermine American leadership in world affairs – "all around the world, aggressors, thugs and terrorists will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our people."[193] Finally, Somalia's location on the Horn of Africa crucially places it next to one of the most high-traffic shipping routes in the world, making it strategically valuable to ensure stability for economic prosperity.

Haiti - 1994

Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the first democratically elected President of Haiti in 1990.[194] The small Caribbean country had been victim to countless coups and civil wars since gaining its independence in the 19th century. On September 30th, 1991, Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras led a military coup against Aristide and took control of the Haitian government.[195]

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[191] Strong, Robert. "Why the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992 was an occasion for thanksgiving." *Newsweek*. N.p., 28 Nov. 2016. Web. <http://www.newsweek.com/somalias-1992-thanksgiving-reflections-us-humanitarian-intervention-horn-523887>.
[192] "Clinton's Words on Somalia: 'The Responsibilities of American Leadership'" *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 07 Oct. 1993. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/08/world/somalia-mission-clinton-s-words-somalia-responsibilities-american-leadership.html?pagewanted=all>.
[193] "Clinton's Words on Somalia: 'The Responsibilities of American Leadership'" *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 07 Oct. 1993. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/08/world/somalia-mission-clinton-s-words-somalia-responsibilities-american-leadership.html?pagewanted=all>.
[194] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.
[195] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.

President George H.W. Bush immediately called "for the restoration of democracy" and was successfully able to implement economic sanctions against the military junta.[196] The Clinton administration had begun negotiations with Cédras that resulted in the Governors Island Accord, which called for Aristide's return to power by October 30th, 1993.[197] The deal fell through, however, and the USS *Harlan Country*, which had arrived in Port-au-Prince on October 11th with military and civilian advisors on board, pulled away due in large part to the violence on Mogadishu only four days earlier.[198] The UN Security Council established a naval blockade of Haiti four days later and a UNSC resolution authorized the use of military force to remove the junta from power.[199] In September 1994, former President Jimmy Carter led a delegation to negotiate with Cédras, including General Colin Powell, but was unsuccessful in reaching an agreement because Cédras was unconvinced the United States would actually invade. During negotiations, the 82nd Airborne Division launched to begin Operation Uphold Democracy to invade Haiti and remove the military junta from power.[200] The U.S. delegation provided footage of the launch to Cédras, who then capitulated to avoid a humiliating defeat and ensure his safe escort from the country. Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15th, 1994 and American forces remained in the country, officially transferring command to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) on March 31st, 1995.[201]

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[196] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.
[197] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.
[198] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.
[199] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.
[200] Kretchik, Walter E., Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel. *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998. Print. p 76.
[201] "Intervention in Haiti, 1994–1995." *U.S. Department of State*. Office of the Historian, n.d. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti>.

There are three prevalent reasons for American involvement in Haiti in 1994. The first is the United States' commitment to upholding democracy around the globe. Both President Bush and the greater international community were quick to condemn the military coup. Second, the coup led to significant human rights abuses against those loyal to Aristide and ultimately led to a significant number of Haitians assembling make-shift rafts to try and escape to the U.S. – they were referred to in the media as 'boat people.'[202] Clinton, who had initially promised to provide political asylum for these refugees, reversed his policy in the days leading up to his inauguration and decided to continue the Bush administration policy of intercepting and returning those fled back to the island.[203] Finally, political pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus, who had been vocal in accusing Clinton of racial biases because of his policy reversal and refusal to take greater action, ultimately convinced Clinton to begin planning a military invasion of the country.[204] There is significant speculation that Aristide was able to successfully lobby the Black Caucus to his cause in order to force President Clinton's hand.[205]

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[202] Sciolino, Elaine. "CLINTON SAYS U.S. WILL CONTINUE BAN ON HAITIAN EXODUS." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 14 Jan. 1993. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/15/world/clinton-says-us-will-continue-ban-on-haitian-exodus.html>.
[203] Sciolino, Elaine. "CLINTON SAYS U.S. WILL CONTINUE BAN ON HAITIAN EXODUS." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 14 Jan. 1993. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/15/world/clinton-says-us-will-continue-ban-on-haitian-exodus.html>.
[204] Holmes, Steven A. "With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 13 July 1994. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/14/world/with-persuasion-and-muscle-black-caucus-reshapes-haiti-policy.html>.
[205] Holmes, Steven A. "With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 13 July 1994. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/14/world/with-persuasion-and-muscle-black-caucus-reshapes-haiti-policy.html>.

**Libya: A Joint Example**

On December 17th, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, self-immolated in Tunis, Tunisia (the capital) in response government harassment and the confiscation of his food cart.[206] The single act incited a wave of democratic uprisings across the Arabic world, known as the Arab Spring. One of the countries that revolted against its long-time leader was Libya, where wide-spread protests against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi erupted into a full-scale civil war in early 2011. This occurred after Libyan government forces firing on protesters on February 15th. With the situation quickly escalating and reports of human rights abuses circulating in the media, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1973 and began planning a no-fly zone.[207] On March 19th, the French deployed fighter jets to remove Libyan air defenses under Opération Harmattan.[208] By the 24th, NATO agreed to take control of the situation and instituted a naval blockade of the Libyan coast as well.[209] The U.S. provided the aerial, in addition to command and control, resources necessary to fully implement the no-fly zone under the codename Operation Odyssey Dawn.[210] The intervention proved extremely successful, forcing Gaddafi to announce his openness to free and fair elections in June. Coalition forces turned him down, however, as they were unconvinced that the Libyan leader would truly accept any popular

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[206] Abouzeid, Rania. "Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire." *Time*. Time Inc., 21 Jan. 2011. Web. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html>.
[207] Davidson, Jason W. "France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26.2 (2013): 310-29. Print. p 315.
[208] Damon, Arwa, Chris Lawrence, Jill Dougherty, Elise Labott, Ed Henry, Jim Bittermann, Paula Newton, Richard Roth, and Nic Robertson Contributed to This Report. "Gunfire, explosions heard in Tripoli." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 19 Mar. 2011. Web. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/19/libya.civil.war/>.
[209] Brown, Ben. "Libya: Nato to take command of no-fly zone." *BBC News*. BBC, 25 Mar. 2011. Web. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12856665>.
[210] Cohen, Tom. "Mullen: No-fly zone effectively in place in Libya." *CNN*. Cable News Network, 20 Mar. 2011. Web. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/20/us.mullen.libya/index.html?hpt=T1>.

referendum.[211] By late August, rebel forces had taken control of the capitol, Tripoli, and Gaddafi was killed on October 20th.[212]

Humanitarian considerations are the primary reason publicized for prompting intervention. Both the French and American governments, echoing the language of UNSC Resolution 1973, cited the moral obligation to prevent any deliberate attacks on civilians and the use of torture and other methods on the part of the Gaddafi regime to combat the rebels. In fact, in the United States, any other suggestion aimed at more fully understanding the military mission was quickly disregarded. President Obama stated: "The task that I assigned our force [is] to protect the Libyan people from immediate danger and to establish a no-fly zone… Broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake."[213] Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated this message, saying "the goals of this campaign right now again are limited, and it isn't about seeing him go."[214] French government officials campaigning for a UNSC resolution to authorize the intervention routinely invoked the imagery of a "brutal and bloody" repression of civilians – Prime Minister François Fillon argued that the "President of the Republic, loyal to values on which our nation is based, refused such an indignity."[215] However, it would be wrong to believe that humanitarian concerns were the only consideration for the intervention given that both France and the U.K. were much stronger

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[211] Carey, Nick. "Rebels dismiss election offer, NATO pounds Tripoli." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 16 June 2011. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110616>.
[212] Jawad, Rana. "Libya's Col Muammar Gaddafi killed, says NTC." *BBC News*. BBC, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15389550>.
[213] Zenko, Micah. "The Big Lie About the Libyan War." *Foreign Policy*. N.p., 18 Apr. 2016. Web. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/>.
[214] Zenko, Micah. "The Big Lie About the Libyan War." *Foreign Policy*. N.p., 18 Apr. 2016. Web. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/22/libya-and-the-myth-of-humanitarian-intervention/>.
[215] Davidson, Jason W. "France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26.2 (2013): 310-29. Print. p 315.

advocates for the intervention than the U.S. – if that was the case, then the United States could be expected to have been as strong an advocate as its European partners.

The geographical proximity of Libya to France, as well as its historic immigration patterns, help to explain this dissonance. Despite never being a French colony, officials believed that flight through either Tunisia and into France or through Italy posed significant enough of a threat as to justify intervening before that became necessary. The French Foreign Minister at the time, Alain Juppé, told the French National Assembly that "helping Libya, Tunisia and Egypt towards the right path was 'in our interest' wherein the goal is a level of political and economic development that 'permits the citizens of the South to live at home, on their land, in their country."[216] This, in combination with valid humanitarian concerns, helps to build a more robust picture of the French strategy for Libya.

Finally, there is the argument for prestige and the French view of their international responsibilities. A common perception among many foreign policy analysts was that France's refusal to engage in either of the popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia had reduced French influence in North Africa and engendered resentment from the new governments.[217] Michelle Alliot-Marie, the French Foreign Minister preceding Juppé, initially offered "French riot control know-how" and accepted a free ride on the private jet of a Tunisian businessman and close ally of President Ben Ali to vacation in Libya during the early days of the uprising.[218] Leading the Western coalition's call for intervention in Libya manifested a quick way to regain France's standing and prestige in a region where it had recently lost it. Support from the African Union

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[216] Davidson, Jason W. "France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26.2 (2013): 310-29. Print. p 316.
[217] Davidson, Jason W. "France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26.2 (2013): 310-29. Print. p 317.
[218] Love, Brian. "French minister says won't quit over Tunisian trip." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 02 Feb. 2011. Web. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-france-idUSTRE71146R20110202>.

and Arab League, in addition to domestic political support, made it a low-cost way to demonstrate France's importance on the international stage.

For the United States, the willingness of both France and the U.K. to take on the leadership of this intervention was crucially important. War fatigue from Iraq and Afghanistan has significantly decreased public support for another war in the Arab world and the ballooning costs of those interventions also deterred American politicians. President Obama himself felt that their willingness to lead was an important symbol and example of the United States does not "have to always be the one who [is] up front… it was precisely in order to prevent the Europeans and the Arab states from holding our coats while we did all the fighting that we, by design, insisted that they lead the mission."[219] This is one of the few examples of policy alignment between Obama and trump, both of whom argue for U.S. allies to take on greater responsibility in ensuring their own safety and promoting stability around the globe.

[219] Goldberg, Jeffrey. "The Obama Doctrine." *The Atlantic*. Atlantic Media Company, 17 Mar. 2016. Web. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.

# V. French Intervention Strategy & Its International Implications

## Characterizing the French Approach

Based on these examples and the prior analysis of French policy and interests, I believe it is possible to draw a conclusion as to what the French strategy in Africa looks like in the modern world: France pursues a realist policy centered on a strategy of selective engagement and offshore balancing. Selective engagement refers to a policy that attempts to navigate the "middle course between an isolationist, unilateralist course… and a world policeman, highly interventionist role."[220] It relies on the use of military force to protect a state's core national interests, both through forward deployment and the use of preemptive action to ensure that national interests can be protected as soon as a new threat emerges.[221] Selective engagement can take on both realist and liberal objectives, so long as those objectives align with core national interests, rather than simply desirable ones.[222] Offshore balancing is a policy that attempts to avoid and insulate a state against great power wars. It assumes that a nation would be safer in a balance of power world, rather than one where it attempts to maintain primacy over all of its competitors because this attempt would simply "provoke other states to balance against" it.[223] This means that a state should seek to limit its mutual defense and deterrent agreements in order to focus more on domestic security. It does not mean that a state will withdraw entirely from the international stage. Instead, offshore balancing suggests that a state will only intervene to prevent

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[220] Art, Robert J. "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement." *International Security* 23.3 (1999): 79-113. Print. p 80.
[221] Art, Robert J. "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement." *International Security* 23.3 (1999): 79-113. Print. p 81.
[222] Art, Robert J. "Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement." *International Security* 23.3 (1999): 79-113. Print. p 80.
[223] Layne, Christopher. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy." *International Security* 22.1 (1997): 86-124. Print. p 113.

challenges to its core national interests and to prevent the rise of a hegemon, regional or otherwise, capable of threatening those core national interests.[224]

Given these strategy objectives, a clear and logical progression of French strategic thinking becomes apparent. Like any government, the French Fifth Republic exists to ensure security, stability and prosperity for the French people. The French leadership believes that in order to achieve these goals, France must maintain its position as a global power, despite the country's limited capacity to enforce its will around the globe compared to other nations like the United States and Russia. Understanding their limitations has led the French to pursue a policy of offshore balancing and selective engagement. These policies mean that France is able to act as an external balancer in Africa that provides security only when absolutely necessary and allows the French to selectively decide when their vital interests are threatened. The implications for French strategy in Africa are thus:

- France views Africa, specifically its former colonies (though not always limited to only former French colonies), as its privileged sphere of influence and a region that is important not only for its defense and economic implications, but also for the continued perception of France as a global power capable of shaping international events.

- France's main objectives within its area of influence in Africa will be to maintain the balance of power in the region by preventing instability that could lead to power vacuums, economic destabilization, or the rise of a regional hegemon capable of challenging French influence in the region.

- France will strive for stability before pursuing humanitarian or ideological considerations.

- Despite its network of mutual defense agreements with many of its former colonies, the French will willingly ignore calls for aid from African leaders unless it deems the threat strategically important to French national interests, economic or otherwise, or the target state is deemed strategically important for regional stability.

- Due to the political fallout of failings in Africa in the mid-1990's, French leaders are now much more concerned with the public reception of their interventions. As such, they will

[224] Layne, Christopher. "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy." *International Security* 22.1 (1997): 86-124. Print. p 114.

seek to justify its African interventions through the accumulation of multilateral support, by invoking claims of operating against terror groups, or by responding to calls for aid from African leaders.

**Implications for the United States**

Given these insights, one fact is abundantly clear: Africa does not represent the same priority for the United States as it does for France. This difference is due to several factors. The U.S. lacks the same history and cultural ties in the region, nor is it as threatened by regional instability and the flow of refugees to which instability might lead. Despite growing interests on the continent, Africa is not as vitally important to American economic development as it is to France. The most significant reason, though, is that the United States' identity as a leading global power and its position on the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member are not directly tied to America's ability to influence events in Africa. The French believe maintaining their status as a permanent member on the UNSC to be one of their most vital national interests and their image as global leader. Taking responsibility for regional stability in Africa is France's way of ensuring that their state remains relevant on the international stage in the 21st Century.

The result of these conclusions is that the United States will not have to exert its influence in Africa in the same way that it recently has in the Middle East and other parts of the world, nor will it need to build up its permanent presence there either. Currently, the U.S. has only one permanent base in the continent, located in Djibouti, which functions primarily as hub for counterterrorism operations and as training ground for the militaries of partner-states on the continent.[225] Additionally, its position on the coast of Djibouti enables it to serve as a support

[225] Whitlock, Craig. "Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations." *The Washington Post*. WP Company, 25 Oct. 2012. Web. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.b34ab17662bf>.

base for anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. However, despite having only one permanent military installment in Africa, U.S. Special Forces deployed to nearly every country on the continent in 2016.[226] So far though, one base has been enough. Many of the U.S. deployments in Africa are either isolated counterterror operations or training missions where American soldiers serve as advisors to fledgling African militaries. Very rarely has the United States been willing to commit significant ground forces to an intervention on the continent, in large part because the French take the lead more often than not when the situation demands a more intense response. That the French are willing to intervene in the former French colonies comes as no surprise, but their willingness to take the lead during the 2011 multilateral intervention in Libya demonstrates that their view of the continent as France's privileged area of influence extends beyond their historical territories. Forging a stronger partnership with France in Africa will enable the United States to promote stability in the region without incurring the same costs as it would if it required to deploy significant forces to address emerging threats. Acknowledging that the French, though more capable of efficiently confronting emerging threats in the region, still have their limitations is a key to this relationship. Intelligence sharing, logistical support, and coalition building are all powerful tools that the United States can use to push France to act in better faith on the continent, to resist the temptation to prop up more authoritarian regimes with poor human rights records in the name of stability. Finally, this benefits the American image abroad. Over the past several decades, especially since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has earned a reputation for acting like the 'world police.' Rather than expand American activities abroad and embrace this image, the U.S. should partner with France to prevent further harm to its image abroad.

[226] See Appendix Figure F

# Appendix

Figure A




227

[227] Guyot, Pascal. "Where France Would Intervene Next in Africa." *Stratfor Worldview*. N.p., 9 May 2016. Web. <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/where-france-would-intervene-next-africa>.

Figure B



228

[228] Défense, Ministère de la. "Carte des opérations et missions militaires." *Defense.gouv.fr*. Ministry of Defense, 28 June 2016. Web. <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-et-missions-militaires>.

Figure C

| | |
|---|---|
| **1956** | *Egypt.* A marine battalion evacuated U.S. nationals and other persons from Alexandria during the Suez crisis. |
| **1964** | *Congo.* The United States sent four transport planes to provide airlift for Congolese troops during a rebellion and to transport Belgian paratroopers to rescue foreigners. |
| **1967** | *Congo.* The United States sent three military transport aircraft with crews to provide the Congo central government with logistical support during a revolt. |
| **1978** | *Zaire.* From May 19 through June 1978, the United States used military transport aircraft to provide logistical support to Belgian and French rescue operations in Zaire. |
| **1981** | *Libya.* On August 19, 1981, U.S. planes based on the carrier *U.S.S. Nimitz* shot down two Libyan jets over the Gulf of Sidra after one of the Libyan jets had fired a heat-seeking missile. The United States periodically held freedom of navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, claimed by Libya as territorial waters but considered international waters by the United States. |
| **1983** | *Egypt.* After a Libyan plane bombed a city in Sudan on March 18, 1983, and Sudan and Egypt appealed for assistance, the United States dispatched an AWACS electronic surveillance plane to Egypt. |
| **1983** | *Chad.* On August 8, 1983, President Reagan reported the deployment of two AWACS electronic surveillance planes and eight F-15 fighter planes and ground logistical support forces to assist Chad against Libyan and rebel forces. |
| **1986** | *Libya.* On March 26, 1986, President Reagan reported to Congress that, on March 24 and 25, U.S. forces, while engaged in freedom of navigation exercises around the Gulf of Sidra, had been attacked by Libyan missiles and the United States had responded with missiles. |
| **1986** | *Libya.* On April 16, 1986, President Reagan reported that U.S. air and naval forces had conducted bombing strikes on terrorist facilities and military installations in Libya. |
| **1989** | *Libya.* On January 4, 1989, two U.S. Navy F-14 aircraft based on the *U.S.S. John F. Kennedy* shot down two Libyan jet fighters over the Mediterranean Sea about 70 miles north of Libya. The U.S. pilots said the Libyan planes had demonstrated hostile intentions. |
| **1990** | *Liberia.* On August 6, 1990, President Bush reported that a reinforced rifle company had been sent to provide additional security to the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and that helicopter teams had evacuated U.S. citizens from Liberia. |
| **1991** | *Zaire*. On September 25-27, 1991, after widespread looting and rioting broke out in Kinshasa, U.S. Air Force C-141s transported 100 Belgian troops and equipment into Kinshasa. U.S. planes also carried 300 French troops into the Central African Republic and hauled back American citizens and third country nationals from locations outside Zaire. |
| **1992** | *Sierra Leone.* On May 3, 1992, U.S. military planes evacuated Americans from Sierra Leone, where military leaders had overthrown the government. |
| **1992** | *Somalia.* On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported that he had deployed U.S. armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a U.N. Security Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international peace. This operation, called Operation Restore Hope, was part of a U.S.-led United Nations Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and came to an end on May 4, 1993. U.S. forces continued to participate in the successor United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), which the U.N. Security Council authorized to assist Somalia in political reconciliation and restoration of peace. |
| **1993** | *Somalia.* On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported that in response to attacks against U.N. forces in Somalia by a factional leader, the U.S. Quick Reaction Force in the area had participated in military action to quell the violence. On July 1 President Clinton reported further air and ground military operations on June 12 and June 17 aimed at neutralizing military capabilities that had impeded U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national reconstruction, and additional instances occurred in the following months. |

**1994** *Rwanda.* On April 12, 1994, President Clinton reported that combat-equipped U.S. military forces had been deployed to Burundi to conduct possible non-combatant evacuation operations of U.S. citizens and other third-country nationals from Rwanda, where widespread fighting had broken out. By September 30, 1994, all U.S. troops had departed from Rwanda and surrounding nations. In the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), Congress barred use of funds for U.S. military participation in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any action necessary to protect U.S. citizens.

**1995** *Somalia.* On March 1, 1995, President Clinton reported that on February 27, 1995, 1,800 combat-equipped U.S. armed forces personnel began deployment into Mogadishu, Somalia, to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. forces assigned there to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). This mission was completed on March 3, 1995.

**1996** *Liberia.* On April 11, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that on April 9, 1996 due to the "deterioration of the security situation and the resulting threat to American citizens" in Liberia he had ordered U.S. military forces to evacuate from that country "private U.S. citizens and certain third-country nationals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy compound.... "

**1996** *Liberia.* On May 20, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the continued deployment of U.S. military forces in Liberia to evacuate both American citizens and other foreign personnel, and to respond to various isolated "attacks on the American Embassy complex" in Liberia. The President noted that the deployment of U.S. forces would continue until there was no longer any need for enhanced security at the Embassy and a requirement to maintain an evacuation capability in the country.

**1996** *Central African Republic.* On May 23, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bangui, Central African Republic, to conduct the evacuation from that country of "private U.S. citizens and certain U.S. Government employees," and to provide "enhanced security for the American Embassy in Bangui."

**1996** *Rwanda and Zaire.* On December 2, 1996, President Clinton reported to Congress that to support the humanitarian efforts of the United Nations regarding refugees in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region of Eastern Zaire, he had authorized the use of U.S. personnel and aircraft, including AC-130U planes to help in surveying the region in support of humanitarian operations, although fighting still was occurring in the area, and U.S. aircraft had been subject to fire when on flight duty.

**1997** *Congo and Gabon.* On March 27, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide enhanced security for American private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be available for any necessary evacuation operation.

**1997** *Sierra Leone.* On May 30, 1997, President Clinton reported to Congress that on May 29 and May 30, 1997, U.S. military personnel were deployed to Freetown, Sierra Leone, to prepare for and undertake the evacuation of certain U.S. government employees and private U.S. citizens.

**1998** *Guinea-Bissau.* On June 12, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that, on June 10, 1998, in response to an army mutiny in Guinea-Bissau endangering the U.S. Embassy, U.S. government employees and citizens in that country, he had deployed a standby evacuation force of U.S. military personnel to Dakar, Senegal, to remove such individuals, as well as selected third country nationals, from the city of Bissau. The deployment continued until the necessary evacuations were completed.

**1998** *Kenya and Tanzania.* On August 10, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had deployed, on August 7, 1998, a Joint Task Force of U.S. military personnel to Nairobi, Kenya, to coordinate the medical and disaster assistance related to the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. He also reported that teams of 50-100 security personnel had arrived in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to enhance the security of the U.S. Embassies and citizens there.

**1998** *Afghanistan and Sudan.* On August 21, 1998, by letter, President Clinton reported to Congress that he had authorized airstrikes on August 20th against camps and installations in Afghanistan and Sudan used by the Osama bin Laden terrorist organization. The President did so based on what he viewed as convincing

information that the bin Laden organization was responsible for the bombings, on August 7, 1998, of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

**1998** *Liberia.* On September 29, 1998, President Clinton reported to Congress that on September 27, 1998 he had, due to political instability and civil disorder in Liberia, deployed a stand-by response and evacuation force of 30 U.S. military personnel to augment the security force at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, and to provide for a rapid evacuation capability, as needed, to remove U.S. citizens and government personnel from the country.

**1999** *Kenya.* On February 25, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress that he was continuing to deploy U.S. military personnel in that country to assist in providing security for the U.S. embassy and American citizens in Nairobi, pending completion of renovations of the American embassy facility in Nairobi, subject of a terrorist bombing in August 1998.

**2000** *Sierra Leone.* On May 12, 2000, President Clinton, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" reported to Congress that he had ordered a U.S. Navy patrol craft to deploy to Sierra Leone to be ready to support evacuation operations from that country if needed. He also authorized a U.S. C-17 aircraft to deliver "ammunition, and other supplies and equipment" to Sierra Leone in support of United Nations peacekeeping operations there.

**2001** *Terrorism threat.* On September 24, 2001, President George W. Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," and "Senate Joint Resolution 23" that in response to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon he had ordered the "deployment of various combat-equipped and combat support forces to a number of foreign nations in the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations." The President noted in efforts to "prevent and deter terrorism" he might find it necessary to order additional forces into these and other areas of the world." He stated that he could not now predict "the scope and duration of these deployments," or the "actions necessary to counter the terrorist threat to the United States."

**2002** *Terrorism threat.* On September 20, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" have been deployed to the Philippines since January 2002 to train with, assist and advise the Philippines' Armed Forces in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities." He added that U.S. forces were conducting maritime interception operations in the Central and European Command areas to combat movement, arming or financing of "international terrorists." He also noted that U.S. combat personnel had been deployed to Georgia and Yemen to help enhance the "counterterrorist capabilities" of their armed forces.

**2002** *Cote d'Ivoire.* On September 26, 2002, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response to a rebellion in Cote d'Ivoire that he had on September 25, 2002, sent U.S. military personnel into Cote d'Ivoire to assist in the evacuation of American citizens and third country nationals from the city of Bouake; and otherwise assist in other evacuations as necessary.

**2003** *Terrorism threat.* On March 20, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," as well as P.L. 107-40, and "pursuant to" his authority as Commander-in-Chief, that he had continued a number of U.S. military operations globally in the war against terrorism. These military operations included ongoing U.S. actions against al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan; collaborative anti-terror operations with forces of Pakistan in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area; "maritime interception operations on the high seas" in areas of responsibility of the Central and European Commands to prevent terrorist movement and other activities; and military support for the armed forces of Georgia and Yemen in counterterrorism operations.

**2003** *Liberia.* On June 9, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that on June 8 he had sent about 35 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel into Monrovia, Liberia, to augment U.S. Embassy security forces, to aid in the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens if necessary. The President also noted that he had sent about 34 combat-equipped U.S. military personnel to help secure the U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania, and to assist in evacuation of American citizens if required. They were expected to arrive at the U.S. embassy by June 10, 2003. Back-up and support personnel were sent to Dakar, Senegal, to aid in any necessary evacuation from either Liberia or Mauritania.

**2003** *Liberia.* On August 13, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that in response to conditions in Liberia, on August 11, 2003, he had authorized about 4,350 U.S. combat-equipped military personnel to enter Liberian territorial waters in support of U.N. and West African States efforts to restore order and provide humanitarian assistance in Liberia.

**2003** *Terrorism threat.* On September 19, 2003, President Bush reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," that U.S. "combat-equipped and combat support forces" continue to be deployed at a

terrorism efforts in the Philippines, and maritime interception operations continue on the high seas in the Central, European, and Pacific Command areas of responsibility, to "prevent the movement, arming, or financing of international terrorists." He also noted that "U.S. combat equipped and support forces" had been deployed to Georgia and Djibouti to help in enhancing their "counterterrorist capabilities."

**2004** *Terrorism/Bosnia and Haiti.* On March 20, 2004, the President reported to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple on-going United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism (including in Afghanistan)," as well as operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Haiti. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,900 personnel); in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,100 personnel); and approximately 1,800 military personnel were deployed in Haiti as part of the U.N. Multinational Interim Force.

**2004** *Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq.* On November 4, 2004, the President sent to Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism." These deployments, support or military operations include activities in Afghanistan, Djibouti, as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In this report, the President noted that U.S. anti-terror related activities were underway in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Eritrea. He further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,800 personnel); and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO-led SFOR (about 1,000 personnel). Meanwhile, he stated that the United States continues to deploy more than 135,000 military personnel in Iraq.

**2005** *Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia.* On May 20, 2005, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism," as well as operations in Iraq, where about 139,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces are also deployed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea, and Djibouti assisting in "enhancing counterterrorism capabilities" of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 235 U.S. personnel are also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as counterterrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia.

**2005** *Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq.* On December 7, 2005, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the global war on terrorism," and in support of the Multinational Force in Iraq, where about 160,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region—Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Djibouti—assisting in "enhancing counterterrorism capabilities" of these nations. The President further noted that U.S. combat-equipped military personnel continued to be deployed in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led KFOR (1,700 personnel). Approximately 220 U.S. personnel were also deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo who assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counterterrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia."

**2006** *Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Bosnia/Iraq.* On June 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 131,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established on November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 250 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counterterrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia."

**2006** *Terrorism threat/Horn of Africa/Kosovo/Bosnia.* On December 15, 2006, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report giving details of multiple ongoing United

States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," in Kosova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as part of the Multinational Force (M.F.) in Iraq. About 134,000 military personnel were deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces were also deployed in the Horn of Africa region, and in Djibouti to support necessary operations against al-Qaida and other international terrorists operating in the region, including Yemen. U.S. military personnel continue to support the NATO-led Kosova Force (KFOR). The U.S. contribution to KFOR was about 1,700 military personnel. The NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo was established on November 22, 2004, as a successor to its stabilization operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to continue to assist in implementing the peace agreement. Approximately 100 U.S. personnel were assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo to assist in defense reform and perform operational tasks, such as "counterterrorism and supporting the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia."

**2007** *Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Afghanistan.* On June 15 and December 14, 2007, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," consolidated reports giving details of ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror,"and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, and Southern Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters.

**2008** *Terrorism threat/Kosovo/Afghanistan.* On June 13 and December 16, 2008, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," consolidated reports giving details of ongoing United States military deployments and operations "in support of the war on terror," and in support of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). The President reported that various U.S. "combat-equipped and combat-support forces" were deployed to "a number of locations in the Central, Pacific, European, Southern and Africa Command areas of operation" and were engaged in combat operations against al-Qaida terrorists and their supporters.

**2009** *Terrorism threat/Afghanistan/Iraq/Kosovo.* On June 15 and December 5, 2009, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," consolidated reports, giving details of "ongoing contingency operations overseas." The report noted that the United states continues to deploy "U.S. combat-equipped forces to help enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies" not only in the Horn of Africa region, but globally through "maritime interception operations on the high seas" aimed at blocking the "movement, arming and financing of international terrorists."

**2010** *Terrorism threat/Afghanistan/Iraq/Kosovo.* On June 15 and December 15, 2010, the President sent to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," a consolidated report, giving details of "deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat." The United States has deployed "combat-equipped forces to a number of locations in the U.S. Central, Pacific, European, Southern and African Command areas of operation" in support of anti-terrorist and anti-al-Qa'ida actions. In addition, the United States continues to "conduct maritime interception operations on the high seas" directed at "stopping the movement, arming and financing of international terrorist groups."

**Source:** CRS Report R41677, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010*, by Richard F. Grimmett

229

[229] Ploch, Lauren. "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa." *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (2011): n. pag. Web. p 33-37.

Figure D




**Source:** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral FDI Statistics, 2014. FDI refers to each Partner Country's total "FDI flows abroad" to countries in SSA from 2001-2012. See UNCTAD for its definition of "FDI flows."

Figure E

[231]

[230] Sy, Amadou, Amy Copley, and Fenohasina Maret-Rakotondrazaka. "The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: A Focus on Foreign Direct Investment | Brookings Institution." *Brookings*. Brookings, 29 July 2016. Web. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/07/11/the-u-s-africa-leaders-summit-a-focus-on-foreign-direct-investment/>.

[231] Lineback, Neal. "Geography in the News: Al Qaeda and Tuareg in Mali." *National Geographic Society (blogs)*. N.p., 17 Jan. 2013. Web. <http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2013/01/15/geography-in-the-news-al-qaeda-and-tuareg-in-mali/>.

Figure F


232

[232] McCarthy, Niall. "U.S. Special Operations Forces Deployed To 70% Of The World's Countries In 2016 [Infographic]." *Forbes*. Forbes Magazine, 07 Feb. 2017. Web. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/02/07/u-s-special-operations-forces-deployed-to-70-of-the-worlds-countries-in-2016-infographic/#5e20318d7343>.